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0. ABSTRACT
Importance: This study provides a prompt analysis of the effectiveness of COVID-19 policies on
a comparative scale. Ultimately, this study aims to foster national and international-level
institutional learnings to better prepare for future infectious disease outbreaks.
Objective: To analyze the variations in COVID-19 control outcomes and understand what factors
contribute to such disparities in eight different Asian countries/regions: Beijing, Henan Province,
Guangdong Province, Zhejiang Province, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.
Study Design: This study first utilizes a comprehensive literature review to summarize the current
sentiments and scholarly comments about the COVID policy response. Then the study proposes
five different hypotheses to explain the differences in outcomes. Finally, the study implements
both quantitative and qualitative analyses to validate the proposed hypotheses
Data and Methods: This research relies heavily on both primary and secondary data collection.
Primary data centers around the policy collection and secondary data focus on outcome-related
variables. Then a correlation analysis and regression models are provided with different variations
of the input and output variables.
Results: Strength of the economy, experiences dealing with past pandemics, and timeliness of
response are the three most important factors influencing the effectiveness of COVID responses.
Conclusion and Relevance: These findings suggest that to have effective control of infectious
disease outbreaks, it’s important to react early. Regions with more experience should be more
careful about future disease outbreaks as they may be more susceptible to transmission in general.
Future studies should focus on discovering more details about different local-level policies and
expand the regions of comparison to a larger context.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On the 31st December 2019, the World Health Organization China Country Office was
informed of cases of pneumonia of unknown etiology in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China (Imai
et al 2020). On January 30th, 2020, the WHO Director-General declared the novel coronavirus
(COVID-19) outbreak a public health emergency of international concern (WHO official website).
This is perhaps the most severe public health alert that the world has faced since severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS). Until November 8th, 2020, there have been a total of 49,578,590
confirmed cases of COVID-19 globally, including 1,245,717 deaths (WHO official website). The
sheer number of infected people is significant, let alone the fallout effects of COVID-19 on the
world’s economy, countries’ health care systems and capacity, and the normal operations of many
nations.
Having immediate and effective policy response is crucial to contain the spread of the
diseases and to minimize public health risks. The risk of infectious diseases recurring and
spreading is high, especially in today’s interconnected world, and requires national and
international public health authorities to take rapid and decisive steps towards containment
(Ahmed et al 2009). Every new and unknown infectious disease is challenging, as it questions the
ability of relevant agencies to take the most optimal and effective actions to minimize the risks of
infection and transmission. Slow reaction to new emerging diseases may lead to devastated
consequences as many infectious diseases grow exponentially. In the case of COVID-19, People’s
Republic of China (PRC) government has been criticized of its initial slow and chaotic policy
responses, which many believed exacerbated the national spread (Mei 2020). Nevertheless, the
author recognizes the barriers to provide the most optimal policy responses immediately, given
that very little information is known at the beginning phase. There are two potential reasons for
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the lack of information. One is the lack of scientific understanding of the disease when the outbreak
started. The other is the fact that some governments may try to cover some important information.
This study aims to analyze what factors are correlated with the effectiveness of government
response policies in coping with COVID-19 pandemic and provide viable policy recommendations
to prepare for any potential future disease outbreaks. Specifically, this study is going to compare
and contrast the COVID-19 responses in different regions in Asia, namely Beijing, Henan Province,
Guangdong Province, Zhejiang Province, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.

1.1 Problem Statement
This study aims to analyze the variations of how COVID-19 outbreak is treated in several
different countries and regions in Asia. First, the author will establish the criteria to describe and
evaluate the effectiveness of the COVID containment. In other words, the author will use metrics
to explain whether the government policies were effective at containing the spread of COVID-19
within the region. The metrics include the growth rate of cases in different regions, the population
adjusted growth rate of the cases in these regions, and the death rate per case identified. After
establishing which regions are more or less effective in their COVID policy responses, this
research then explores the key question of what factors contribute to the disparities in outcomes of
combatting COVID-19 in these countries and regions. COVID-19 policies include both macrolevel and micro-level ones. Macro-level policies refer to the national or state level stay-at-home
orders, contact tracing requirements, travel restrictions between different cities/countries, and
official quarantine rules. Micro-level policies incorporate specific hospital rules about what types
of people could be tested and whether the resident communities have limitations on the number of
times each person can go out every day. Beyond looking at what policies were in place, this study
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also records when relevant policies were implemented in each area as a measure of the “timeliness”
aspect of the research.
Upon understanding the outcomes of the COVID-19 response policies and what kinds of
policies were in place during the time, the key question of this study is to find what factors are
correlated with the success of failure of an effective outcome. Namely, what are the predictors for
whether a country or a region can be relatively successful in containing the spread of COVID-19.
Would it merely be what kinds of policies implemented in these regions, or how early the polices
were introduced? Or would there be additional factors that can influence the disparities in the
outcomes we observed? To successfully dissect the correlated factors, the author needs to control
for many heterogeneity aspects of the policy data. As such, the author chooses to limit the regions
and timeframes of the analysis, with rationale explained below.
There are two main reasons to focus on Asia for this analysis. First, most Asian countries’
experiences with COVID-19 were characterized as exogenous shocks because none of regions
anticipated what was coming. Comparing to countries on other continents, the first cases in the
regions of interests appeared almost two months earlier. During the first two months, very little
information was gathered regarding the disease and hence leading to a complete shock for the
government institutions. For countries that were affected later on, the local health authorities and
policymakers were more aware of the potential challenges and had more time to prepare for it. The
reason to not compare with New Zealand, which is deemed to have an extremely effective policy
response, comes from similar consideration. Even though New Zealand is recognized to have
better outcomes than almost all countries in the world, given that COVID-19 was spread very late
to New Zealand and its geographical remoteness from other regions, it does not serve as a good
comparator. Second, these regions have some similar characteristics that reduce the overall
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confounding heterogeneity. These regions experienced the first imported case of COVID-19 at
almost the same time and have mostly approached an end of the first wave of the disease outbreak
by mid-May. This makes these places comparable on the time scale and also allows for the
outcomes of COVID control to be observed. Additionally, these regions have relatively denser
populations compared to the world and are considered to be transportation hubs within Asia. Hence,
by limiting the analysis to Beijing, Henan Province, Guangdong Province, Zhejiang Province,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, the author strives to minimize the cofounding
heterogeneity between regions in order to maximizes the power of analysis.
The timeframe of the study is limited between the start of the first identified cases in these
regions to mid-May. The deliberate choice to focus only on the policy responses during the initial
wave is based on three considerations. First, COVID-19 came as a shock to the world before the
“initial wave”. The governments had much more information about COVID when the second wave
came in some regions and their responses were quite different than the initial wave period. Hence,
the responses coming from different government back then were more representative of their
behaviors for future pandemics. Second, as COVID-19 continues to affect the countries of study
and many new policies are being implemented continuously, the later results may incorporate
effects from the earlier policies and the later policies. Focusing on the first-wave period ensures
that the outcomes of COVID control were of those initial policies. In the regions of study, midMay is identified as the ending period of the “first wave” because the number of newly identified
cases was stabilized, some even went close to zero for these regions. Therefore, using mid-May as
the ending point effectively summarizes the policy effects from the first stage of the disease. Lastly,
on the practical realm, the data appears to be more readily available for the initial period of the
outbreak. Some later policies have yet to demonstrate its effectiveness or lack of. Focusing on the
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initial period where the effectiveness can be measured and quantified reliably enhances the validity
of this research.

1.2 Motivations
This study provides its value added to the scholarly field of policy analysis and COVID
academic research from multiple aspects. It’s important for the government to reflect on their
policies after crisis, and few seem to be done in the past. Learning from COVID-19 policy
responses and foster institutional changes in the future can provide prolonged benefits. If we
understand what worked effectively to contain the spread and transmission of the infectious
diseases on the policy level, countries may be able to better prepare and respond to any future
disease outbreaks. There are three main underlying motivations.
To start, many related policy analyses have focused on a single area. Most of the studies
provide a comprehensive description of what was done in the specific areas and the results of those
policies. Specifically, many research articles regarding the contact tracing, quarantine measures,
and early detection have been developed in South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan.
These studies have not taken into account of the counterfactuals (i.e., what would have happened
if such policies were not in place) or lateral comparisons to other regions. A lateral comparison of
these regions can explain explicitly what policies were unique to these regions and whether those
unique policies contribute to the outcomes of COVID control, hence serving as the counterfactuals
from regions to regions. Even though the comparison may be challenged by the heterogeneity of
the research subjects and lack of counterfactuals in many cases, a comparative study is informative
as it can use each region in the study as a counterfactual of another to tell a compelling story. This
study, therefore, aims to summarize the different policies in the aforementioned regions and focus
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specifically on the unique policies in each region and elucidate whether that has an effect on the
overall COVID response.
Second, many scholarly articles treat the effectiveness of COVID response in China as a
wholistic entity. However, the author disagrees with this general approach and argues that
provincial differentiation existed for both the policy implementation and the effectiveness of
COVID response. Beyond national orders, various policies were in place on the provincial level.
As Mei (2020) noted in the research, some provinces responded more effectively than others and
there could be reasons such as prior experiences dealing with infectious diseases, or the differences
in community-based responses. Furthermore, different provinces in China were faced with
different conditions at the start and it’s worth exploring whether these differences led to the varying
outcomes. Examples of such differences include the distance between and travel frequency to the
hotspot Wuhan, Hubei, the level of economic development and health care capacities, and the
awareness of infectious diseases and trust in the government.
Additionally, it still appears to be the trend that the focus of COVID-19 research is on the
medical and scientific underpinnings, especially in the first few months. While it is undoubtedly
important to focus on the treatment and preventions from the scientific perspective, the author
argues that more attention should be given to how global health care crisis can be managed at the
political and social level. In today’s interconnected world, any infectious disease is destructive,
and a successful containment and elimination is only possible through international collaboration.
It is important to understand whether the government has taken the right actions, and it is more
important to understand it in a prompt manner. Unfortunately, most policy analyses only came out
years after the actual crisis, making it difficult for the government to adjust quickly. Taken the
examples of SARS and Ebola, most evaluation of government policies only came out more than
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five years after the original outbreak, which greatly reduces the ability for the administrative
institutions to receive immediate feedback on the effectives of the polices or adjust accordingly.
By pushing more immediate attentions on the policy responses after disease outbreaks, the author
encourages the academic community to respond more quickly for future crisis management
policies and provide more immediate assessment to authorities. Especially given that COVID is
rapidly evolving, the prompt assessment of current government policies is more crucial.
The author firmly argues that institutional changes need to be in place to minimize the
consequences of any infectious disease outbreaks. Unfortunately, there hasn’t been a lot of
institutional learnings from past pandemics such as SARS or Ebola. Some countries and regions
seemed to repeat the same mistakes this time as the ones they made from dealing with other
pandemics. For example, the governments tried to hide the fact of an infectious disease outbreak
at the beginning phases. Ahmed et al (2009) criticized the lack of response and the deliberate
hiding of information from the public for the SARS outbreak in 2003. Similar issues have been
observed by the author that at the beginning of COVID outbreak, the government initially also
tried to lower the attention on the disease. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) government
seems to have repeated the mistake of initial denial. The initial denial for SARS has been shown
by multiple authors, including Ahmed et al (2009), Schwartz & Evans (2007), and Dan et al (2009)
to lead to a faster spread of the disease and a worse containment result. The results of the initial
denial for COVID-19 have yet to be shown by the academic community, but the general sentiments
have been negative as well. Additionally, both pandemics revealed the lack of appropriate health
care facilities to isolate and treat infected patients. As a result, the governments have to build the
Fangcang hospitals, which will be explained further in the Literature Review section, in order to
handle the increasing capacity.
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These two repeated actions observed in both SARS and COVID have demonstrated the
lack of institutional learnings from past mistakes. The author believes that an effective institutional
change should include devising new guidelines in terms of preventing and dealing with disease
outbreaks and/or improving the current health care system to better prepare for the worst-case
scenario. By conducting a comparative study to thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of COVID
response policies, the author aims to bring attentions to the current COVID policies in multiple
regions and foster such institutional changes, which leads to the policy implications of this research.

1.3 Significance and Policy Implications
The primary targeted audiences of this thesis research are the policymakers and health care
authorities. In order to foster institutional learnings, it is important that the message from this
research can be passed on the government. It’s especially important that this information can be
shared with countries and regions that are analyzed in this research. The analyses below provide a
direct evaluation of the effectiveness of their COVID-19 policy response and should alert different
government bodies about their performances. Given that many of the regions studied in this
research are neighboring regions, it can be even more important to learn about what policies were
effective for others and try to adapt to future policy changes. For other political entities, even
though their policies were not directly evaluated, they should still strive to understand the findings
and conclusions of this research to identify similarities and differences in their own policy response.
If they see similar mistakes, either by implementing a less effective policy or the lack of an
effective policy, they may be able to avoid making similar mistakes by correcting their policy
responses. In terms of the health care authorities, it is important that the methods of study and
conclusions to be recognized by the academia. Since this research expects to draw more attention
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on the policy research about health care crisis, having the academic community access the
information and conclusion in this research can be a crucial first step. If the scholarly field
identifies the unique value added of a comparative policy study for COVID-19, it is the author’s
hope that more researches will be initiated, potentially focusing on different regions of analysis.
Additionally, this research can serve as a supplementary material for other published studies that
only focus on one region of analysis. The lateral comparisons in this research can draw even further
insights in their specific regions. By informing the policymakers and academic community, this
research ultimately aims to draw more attention on the prompt analysis of government policies for
emerging health care crisis. If countries and regions can pay close attention to their current
behaviors and learn from past mistakes, it is expected that they will come up with better coping
strategies and be more prepared for future health care emergencies.
However, this research should not be exclusive to the primary audiences. Since COVID19 affects every individual’s life from multiple aspects, it is important that this research is
accessible and understandable to anyone interested in learning about COVID-19 policy responses.
After reading this research paper, audiences should have a general grasp of policies in their local
areas and make preliminary judgments about the effectiveness of their local policies. The
effectiveness of any policy is influenced by the willingness of the general public to comply and
their sentiments towards the policy. Most people are probably familiar with their some of their
local policies, providing a wholistic picture of the policies can further their understanding and
letting them reflect on their sentiments towards the policy responses. Furthermore, learning about
policies in other geopolitical areas may even stimulate their thinking about what could have been
effective to implement in their region. Under the best-case scenario, this research may ultimately
inspire grassroot movements from the general public to request modifications in their local policies,
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leading to a collective action from the public and the government to optimize the policy responses
for COVID and any future pandemics.
As mentioned before, the promptness of this policy research demonstrates its value added.
While most other pandemics response policy are generally produced at least five years after the
crisis, this paper aims to provide the analysis within a year. As COVID-19 is still an ongoing threat
in the world, a comprehensive understanding of the policy responses during the initial waves of
the pandemics can shed light on how to proceed forward. Although more comprehensive and
accurate data will only be available years after the crisis, it is critical to provide such interim reports
that provide insights into the preliminary effectiveness and can inform changes to be adopted in
the current policies. Up to date, most regions of study in this research has faced a much better
condition compared to where they started, the author believes that there are places to optimize the
responses even further.
Of course, this research may not be the only one addressing the effectiveness of COVID
policy responses. Many more similar studies are expected to be published especially in the next
few years. It will be worthwhile for the scholarly field to compare and contrast the results from
similar research to see if there are common grounds or stark contrast in the conclusions. If some
aspects are generally agreed upon in several different research, it might be an important area for
the political entities to start reflecting on. On the other hand, if the scholarly field disagrees on
some aspects of the effectives of response, it will engender further discussions and more academic
research to dissect the underlying reasons. As scholarly efforts are built upon one another, this
study may be the one to open up the communication in the health care management space about
evaluating government performances in COVID-19 response.
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A comparative study on the effectiveness of COVID response polices is critical in the realm
of COVID academic research. For policymakers, it provides a prompt interim analysis on their
performances and helps them to adjust and adapt to new policies if necessary. For the academic
filed, it opens up the discussion earlier for policy analyses, with the hope to motivate more similar
research in the field. For the general public, it serves as a background overview of their local
policies and helps them reflect on their experiences and sentiments. Combining different aspects,
this research ultimately hopes to foster the institutional changes in the future, so that the world can
be better prepared for future pandemics and any health care crisis.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Given that this research is a timely analysis of the COVID policy responses, there hasn’t
been much comprehensive literature in the related academic filed at the beginning. As time
progresses, more relevant research have been published during the interim of this study and the
author has actively incorporated them into the section below. Most of the newly published articles
only focus on one country or region for the policy response. Therefore, the author also chose to
focus more broadly on the analyses of policy responses for past pandemics such as SARS or MERS.
To gain insights from the current field of study and to critically analyze the drawbacks of current
academic studies, the literature review section is going to focus on three key areas.
First, the author is going to provide an overview of the past analyses on pandemic responses
of the relevant countries and regions of study. There are three main purpose for this section. Firstly,
it is worth exploring how were these regions dealing with similar health crisis in the past and how
well did they response. This will not only summarize whether these regions have prior experiences
of dealing with rapidly evolving health crisis, but also provide some preliminary insights into how

13

effective these regions used to be in infectious outbreak containment. Second, it will be interesting
to compare the effectiveness of past responses to the results from this paper (i.e. effectiveness of
current response policies for COVD). Based on whether the results are similar or drastically
different, different policy suggestions can be provided to the local governments to better prevent
future crisis. By comparing to the policies and effectiveness of policy responses to the past, the
author also hopes to understand whether some of these regions learned from their past mistakes
dealing with other pandemics and apply the strategic changes to combatting COVID. Third, these
past literatures may provide more insights on how to properly choose the metrics to represent the
effectiveness of government response policy for pandemics. Even though the author may not
directly adopt the entire methodology from any of the past study, these metrics serve as a
foundation for the author’s understanding of the academic field and guide the metrics of
measurements that is presented later in the paper.
Then, the author is going to explore the newly published articles in the relevant academic
field until the end of October. As mentioned before, the newly published articles focus mostly on
one single country or region, but they did provide a relatively comprehensive analysis for that
region itself. These articles can provide a preliminary summary of the different kinds of policies
implemented at these regions and some included analyses of their effectiveness. Furthermore, the
authors can also use information from these articles as a validation to her own data collection. In
other words, the author can compare whether there was important missing information from the
primary data collection by comparing to the existing policies from the published articles. However,
it does appear that most of these researches only discuss the relationship between public health
prevention-related policies and the effectiveness of policy response, but not other aspects that may
be interesting in predicting the results of COVID containment.

14

Lastly, the author notices that unlike pandemics in the past, COVID is perhaps the most
global pandemics since the bursting of digital technologies and social media development. In
conjunction with the highest than ever Internet usage rate and the penetration of social media, it
makes the nature of the COVID pandemic response interesting. On one hand, it might be easier
for the government to publish policies and monitor the results of the policy responses as data are
available online and almost in real-time. On the other hand, it’s also easier to collect people’s
sentiments towards the government responses. Many countries and regions have taken advantage
of the convenience of network to gather information and provide more effective tracing and
prevention strategies, although privacy and legal concerns still remain. Furthermore, data on social
media platforms can help us grasp into how people felt about the government responses may lead
to some preliminary results of the success of government policies. It is expected that the era of
social media will be more influential in the upcoming decades. Therefore, an understanding into
how the advancements in technology and social media communication affected the current
pandemic response may shed light on hot to better prepare for future crisis. In fact, some scholars,
such as Gralinski and Menachery (2020), have already sensed the differences in COVID policy
responses with SARS responses by noticing the changes in the roles of Internet communication
and social media.

2.1 Policy Response Analysis for SARS Pandemics
There have been many past pandemics in recent human history and most of the recent ones
have been studied carefully by the academia. Different narratives in terms of the effectiveness of
responses and suggestions for better measures have been provided in these researches. After some
compare and contrast, the author decides to focus on the study of SARS policy response to achieve
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the aforementioned three goals. The choice to compare with SARS is based on the following
considerations. First, SARS is perhaps the most comparable infectious disease to COVID-19 given
the similarities in the viruses, the initial uncertainties around the scientific underpinnings,
including the route of spread, the effective treatment, and prevention methods, and the origin of
both viruses in China. Second, SARS is also relatively recent in human history and the government
and the health care systems tend to be more similar compared to pandemics in the past. Third, most
of the subjects in this study was affected by the SARS outbreak, although to different extent, and
hence we may be able to gain some initial insights into the effectiveness of pandemics response
policies in the past.
The very first SARS case was identified in Foshan, Guangdong Province, China in
November 2002 (Dan et al 2009). It was quickly spread to 8,096 people in 29 different countries
in the next 8 months (CDC official website). Most research focused on the effectiveness of policy
response in China, the origin of the disease. China was generally criticized for its delayed
responses for SARS pandemics when it started and multiple authors speculated that government’s
reaction to hide the information at the beginning may have exacerbated the national and
international spread of the diseases. Ahmed et al (2009) argued that Chinese government showed
an initial reluctance to deal openly with the situation. This could be due to either political
considerations that announcing such information earlier may lead to unnecessary panics in the
nation or the logistical difficulties to control the spread of the disease. Schwartz & Evans (2007)
also described the situation as “unsurprising” when they learned that the government was slow to
recognize the seriousness and challenges of SARS and the fact that very little action was taken in
the early months of the epidemic. Even though the responses from the earlier months received
many criticisms, many scholars agreed that later policy responses in China showed great

16

improvements and many ended up being effective at containing the further spread of the disease.
General strategies included building a Fangcang hospital in Beijing, clear stay-at-home orders and
limited traveling options, and active communications with the international community. Fangcang
hospitals, which became prevalent in COVID responses this year, refer to the temporary hospitals
built to isolate and treat infectious patients, usually using existing public venues such as the sports
stadiums or construction sites (Chen et al 2020). Ahmed et al (2009) argued that once Chinese
government changed its policy, it developed an impressive control strategy that was followed by
billions of people in the country. Starting April 21, China started to trace and track the close
contacts of infected patients, providing early isolations and interventions to prevent further spread
of SARS effectively (Ahmed et al 2009). Pang et al (2003) also commented on the quarantine
strategies in Beijing that they successfully identified 30,000 close contacts and were able to
quarantine these people either at home or in a hospital, with 60% of them quarantined individually.
Furthermore, with an effort facilitated by the WHO, Beijing also incorporated the travelerscreening strategy as part of its policy response. Beijing government made sure to set up different
checkpoints along bus stations, railways, and airports to closely monitoring people entering and
leaving the regions to minimize the risks of infection (Ahmed et al 2009, Pang et al 2003). These
strategies translated into effective control of the spread of SARS. To sum up, responses of COVID
in China, with a focus on the Guangdong Province and Beijing, are characterized by an initial
inefficient response for the first four months and followed by an improved efficient strategy
starting in late March and early April.
On the other hand, out of the 29 affected countries and regions, Singapore, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan have been viewed to have the most effective policy responses. SARS became
identifiable in Singapore starting in early March. Opposite to many initial negative feedbacks for
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Guangdong Province in China, Singapore and Hong Kong received many positive judgements
even from the very beginning in terms of their policies for contact tracing and quarantine measures.
Tan (2006) points out that Singapore made intensive efforts to locate contacts within 24 hours of
case notification, set up a contact tracing center with up to 140 employees, utilize the armed forces
in contact tracing, and set up a contact database accessible to all hospitals. Singapore government
also demanded that all hospitals should report the number of cases of SARS every day even though
the case number is zero (Ahmed et al 2009). On top of the effective hospital measures, Singapore
also made significant efforts to early contact tracing. Tan (2006) argued that Singapore
government was able to expand the WHO definition of “cases” and “potential cases” and allowed
them to have an expanded network of people to keep track of to identify atypical conditions as
early as possible. These strategies were widely appraised by many scholars and government
institutions and many of which were adopted later on by other countries (Ahmed et al 2009).
Because Hong Kong was in geographic proximity with Guangdong Province, SARS cases
were spread to HK earlier in February. Taiwan observed its first case of SARS in a similar timeline
as Singapore in mid-March. Even during the stages of which the PRC government was still
reluctant to share more information about the disease, Hong Kong and Taiwan government has
taken active and preemptive measures. Similar to Singapore’s response strategy, both places have
also taken a precautionary measure to notify the hospitals to be prepared for cases of SARS in
early February even before the onset of the first case at February 15th (Ahmed et al 2009). On top
of that, Hong Kong has taken special measures to protect the vulnerable groups—elderly
residents— who are more likely to be infected (Tsang 2005). Additionally, both Hong Kong and
Taiwan have delegated an ample amount of medical resources before the number of cases spiked.
As Brudon & Cheng (2006) mentioned, Hong Kong and Taiwan initially assigned specific units
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within the hospitals to be used for SARS patients and for quarantine of suspected individuals. Later
on, both places decided to assign entire hospitals for isolating and treating the patients, which
effectively reduced the transmission route between infected patients and others. Overall, it seems
like Hong Kong and Taiwan government have more awareness to prepare for the SARS outbreak
and have more medical resources to delegate at hand.
Comparing provinces in China with other Asian countries and regions, Schwartz and Evans
(2007) attributed the effective responses in regions such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore
partly to the closer communications of them with the World Health Organization (WHO), which
at the time served as an important mediator between many countries and regions. Another study
from Chan et al (2010) supported this argument by saying that prior to the SARS outbreak, PRC
gave very little priority to the threat of infectious disease epidemics in the country, adding yet
another layer of reasons for the lack of effectiveness of China’s SARS response. On the other hand,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore had a much longer history to following WHO guidelines and
cooperating with WHO to minimize the risks of diseases. However, it has been observed that the
SARS outbreak may have triggered China to be more involved with the global health affair and be
more cooperative and proactive in international organizations such as the WHO (Chan et al 2010).
This political change is therefore interesting, as we can observe whether the changes in government
attitudes after SARS have facilitated the maturation of public health response system in China in
preparation for future public health emergencies.
In terms of methodologies, SARS scholar articles are generally aligned in what they used
to represent the effectiveness of government responses. In general, the authors have used the
identified case numbers, mortality rates, and the time to which it takes for the country/region to
clear the newly increasing cases to zero as proxies for the effectives of government policy
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responses. Since most of the SARS research were conducted after it disappeared, the authors were
able to collect those numbers and datasets. In the context of this research, some of the parameters
may not be applicable because COVID is an ongoing disease and many of these numbers have not
been finalized. Furthermore, none of the research above seem to consider the impacts of population
dynamics in different places. The author suspects that more densely populated areas may subject
to quicker transmission of the disease and this research will take into account of the different
population density levels. For specific analyses, COVID research focused on the qualitative aspect,
i.e., describing what happened in different countries at different timelines. The qualitative
discussions are very effective in these researches, as it provides comprehensive discussions from
multiple aspects and the tones of the discussions remain neutral. While the author is going to mimic
the qualitative strategies from relevant literatures, this is also only partially applicable for the
purpose of this research. The author hopes to combine the use of qualitative and quantitative data
analysis for COVID as the quantitative data analysis can provide further insights into how much
each factor may influence the success of COVID containment in each of the country/region. The
metrics of measurement chosen for the analysis of this study will be further explained in the “Data
and Methods” section.
Even though these studies provide comprehensive summaries on SARS responses and
government policies, there remained a few caveats in the research methods and conclusions. First,
the scholars don’t seem to consider the fact that SARS was spread to different regions at quite
different times, which could confound the results of their findings. For example, the first case
appeared in China in November 2002 whereas it didn’t appear in Singapore until March 2003. The
time gap between the appearances of the first case may have left different governments with
different amount of time to prepare for and devise the policies. It won’t be a surprise that countries
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with more time to prepare for the disease outbreak be more effective in their policy responses, so
a lack of control on the time of the spread may reduce the credibility of some of the researches.
Second, these past studies didn’t recognize other factors that may influence the government’s
ability to implement or even propose policies. One such example would be the health care
resources available per capita. It could be that fewer hospitals and hospital beds are available in
mainland China, and this is why China couldn’t separate out hospital units, or even the entire
hospitals, for isolating and treating SARS patients in the beginning. These factors, although
seemingly not directly related to the effectiveness of SARS policy response, may have played an
important role. Third, most of these studies have focused on qualitative discussions of the different
policies in different countries and the results of SARS containment. No connections seem to be
drawn about the implementation of the policies and the effectiveness of disease control. Although
some authors explained that it was hard to draw any causal influences because there were many
policies involved and that there’s no counterfactuals in policy analysis, the author insists that
maybe some correlation can be identified by controlling some factors. Note that a further
expansion on the drawbacks of current researches will be addressed separately in the section below.

2.2 Newly Published Articles about COVID-19 Policy Responses
At the beginning phase of this research, there was no literature directly related to the field
of interest for this research. As time progresses, some scholars have noticed the similar research
topics and have been summarizing the quarantine measures and contact tracing strategies in several
Asian countries. These articles will provide a background for the author to understand the
preliminary results in the field and borrow their methodology if applicable. There are a few
characteristics of the following articles that especially provide the value-added to this research.
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First, most of these articles provided analyses of different policies in details, serving as a good
background for the author to understand more about response policies in these regions. Most of
these articles go more in-depth in terms of describing the policies but doesn’t focus that much on
analyzing the effects or the outcomes of these policies. Second, these studies focus on a similar
timeline as this study, namely from the start of COVID pandemic to approximately May. This is
important because as stressed earlier, this research focuses on the policy implemented during the
initial stage of the disease and these articles seem to align with it. This makes the result from these
literature articles more transferrable to understanding the context for this research. Furthermore,
the existence of such literature proves the fact that the data is relatively available in the proposed
regions and proposed timelines, adding a layer of confidence for the data collection below. Thirds,
these existing researches seem to agree with each other on that conclusions drawn from literatures
focusing on the same region are in parallel with each other and no explicit conflicts are identified
between authors. Based on these characteristics, it is important to summarize the key takeaways
form the current literatures and build the foundation for this research. We will begin by analyzing
the specific policies and evaluations of these regions one-by-one (in alphabetic order), and then
followed by a critical comparison of some of the important policies/measures mentioned. Note that
there wasn’t any article commenting on Beijing’s specific policy response up to the point of the
research, so Beijing is excluded from below for this purpose.

2.2.1 Guangdong Province
Recall that Guangdong Province is where the first SARS case was discovered. Many
believe that experiences from SARS have helped Guangdong Province to better train their medical
staff to prepare for future disease outbreak and for the government to devise a better coping
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strategy. Because of its dense population, there were also a lot of people coming back from Wuhan
to Guangdong Province for Chinese New Year. It is estimated that around 0.4 million people came
back to Guangdong Province, with half of them going to the two main cities Guangzhou and
Shenzhen (Zhang et al, 2020). Therefore, the slow reproduction rate of Guangzhou Province is
also very impressive (Wang and Tenuis, 2020). Zhang et al (2020) commented on Guangdong
Province for following the principles of “‘early detection, early reporting, early isolation, and early
treatment”. It is noticed that Guangdong Province is actually the first province to initiate the
highest level of public health emergency response, on the same day that Wuhan announced the
citywide lockdown. After the highest order of public health status, Guangdong Province quickly
established many measures including checking temperatures, wearing masks, and release public
information to the citizens. Scholars have suspected that the cautious attitudes came from the slow
reaction to SARS (Zhang et al, 2020), which exacerbated the spread to both China and the world.
Since Guangdong is a relatively developed province in China, it has a higher level of health
care provisions and better quality of care in general (Tan 2006). Starting in January, the
Guangdong government has disposed 104 hospitals over 17 thousand medical professionals to
fight and prevent COVID. Most of these hospitals and medical professionals have experiences
dealing with SARS (Zhang et al, 2020). In addition, the government has also urged hospitals to
open up free online consultation programs to reduce the need for people to go to the hospital and
hence limiting the risks of cross-infection within the hospital (Zhang el at, 2020). Therefore, the
combination of government’s and hospital’s experiences of dealing with SARS, plus the effective
healthcare provisions in Guangdong Province, have contributed to the relatively slower day-today growth rate of cases.
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2.2.2 Henan Province
Henan Province has received mostly positive comments about their early actions on
traveler screening and active cooperation with the central government in responding to national
policies and devising more adaptive local-level policies. Given the geographical proximity of
Henan Province to Hubei Province, many people travel frequently between Henan Province and
Hubei Province. Furthermore, because of the population structure, that many Henan residents
actually work outside of the province, and the time coincidence with Chinese New Year, many
people travelled back to Henan Province to celebrate the festival with their families. It is estimated
that out of the 5 million people that left Wuhan before January 23rd, 2020, 0.3 million of them
arrived in Henan Province (Song et al, 2020). Knowing this large population flow between the two
provinces, the Henan Provincial Government was alerted early on to implement strict traveler
screening. This traveler screening was made possible with the help of grassroot communities, who
also managed to help monitor the behaviors of people in home quarantines (Yang et al, 2020). In
addition, the government also tries to close down some travelling routes even before the city
lockdown of Wuhan on January 23rd, 2020. This preventative measure is widely praised by
different other provinces, saying that it may have reduced the number of imported cases (Wang
and Tenuis, 2020).
Second, multiple studies have stressed the importance that the local government has played
in responding very cooperatively to national orders. Yang et al (2020) discusses that Henan
Provincial Government quickly implemented the guidance from PRC and have raised public
awareness of the disease through multiple channels, including TVs, non-commercial
advertisement, radio series, and etc. Furthermore, different cities within Henan Province also
implemented specific rules to further prevent the spread of the disease. As an example, Zhengzhou,
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which is the capital city of Henan Province, opened a special information line that provides 24hour free consultation for people to get more information and direct suspected people to the correct
medical service centers (Yang et al, 2020). Therefore, the cooperative attitudes from both
provincial and city governments, and from the grassroot communities have successfully reduced
the transmission rate of COVID-19 within Henan Province.

2.2.3 Hong Kong
The COVID pandemic in Hong Kong was characterized by a few waves of imported cases
with limited local transmissions (Lam et al, 2020). This is unusual since most countries have
experience a high level of community spread after the initial important period (Cohen and
Kupferschmidt, 2020). The low community spread of COVID cases in Hong Kong speaks to the
relatively effective policy responses. After the initial wave of importation, Lam et al (2020) argued
that the government has strengthened the border controls and have prevent flights from landing or
connecting in Hong Kong. Furthermore, the government mandated the trace and home quarantine
of every close contacts up to 14 days (Lam et al, 2020).
Interestingly, some scholars suggest that the success of Hong Kong’s COVID containment
has less to do with effective government policies, but more correlation to the grassroot-level public
responses and self-organized activities. Hartley and Jarvis (2020) pointed out that there is an
inherent lack of trust from Hong Kong people to the government, especially after what happened
in 2019. Therefore, many people didn’t trust the government guidelines. Nevertheless, while
people didn’t really trust the government, there is a high rate of voluntary mask-wearing behavior
starting in January and that could have contributed to the low local transmission of COVID in
Hong Kong. Additionally, Hartley and Jarvis (2020) criticized the lack of government provision
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of facemasks for all the residents. Rather, the grassroot activists have actually purchased and
distributed the masks to people in need. Cowling et al (2020), although way less extreme than
Hartley and Jarvis (2020), also attributed part of the success of Hong Kong’s policy to people’s
behavioral changes. Upon an interview with different groups in Hong Kong, they found that people
have voluntarily changed their behaviors and adapted to social distancing very well (Cowling et
al, 2020). Additionally, many people tried to avoid to go to the hospitals because of the risks of
cross-infections. Unlike Hartley and Jarvis (2020), Cowling et al (2020) believe that the social
behavior changes followed the initiation of various government policies and extensive public
education and awareness on the disease.
However, all authors seem to agree that experiences with SARS has prepared the region
better for any future health care crisis. Lam et al (2020) suggested that the government adapted its
policy from SARS responses and Cowling et al (2020) also mentioned that the public was more
alerted than other regions because of their experiences with SARS. Even Hartley and Jarvis (2020)
mentioned that the SARS pandemic had revolutionized the health care system in Hong Kong and
making it more prepared for pandemics as such. Hence, whether the success of Hong Kong is due
to the effective government policy on border controls, quarantine measures, and public education,
or due to the community-level responses, or a combination of both factors remains unknown and
requires further evaluation.

2.2.4 Singapore
Singapore shows unique response strategies by focusing on hospital resources reallocations.
Wong et al (2020) detailed about the strategies across hospitals in Singapore to reallocate their
staff, to mobilize their hospital beds and to modify the regular flow of patients within the hospital.
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Specifically, they made sure to isolate enough hospital beds and operating rooms for COVID
patients, update medical staff about the latest information starting in early January, and start to
accumulate personal protective equipment (PPE) and respiratory machines (Wong et al, 2020).
These measures ensure that the hospitals have ample resources to deal with the peak of the
pandemics. Furthermore, Kuguyo, Kengne, and Dandara (2020) mentioned that Singapore has
established 900 Response Public Health Preparedness Clinics (PHPCs) across the country, which
served as the intermediary between the community and hospitals. These clinics will track and
measure patients with flu-like symptoms, and then classify them as high-risk vs. low-risk for
COVID infection. The existence of PHPCs, therefore, reduced the risks of people going into
hospitals and also made sure that people with suspected symptoms know the right place to visit.
These two measures together, lower the risks of within-hospital transmissions and try to protect
both the medical staff and the vulnerable groups.
Singapore also has a unique contact tracing method called TraceTogether, which was
developed and implemented later in March. The use of TraceTogether has also been recognized to
improve the overall COVID outcomes in the country. The details about TraceTogether will be
addressed in the next section below. Researches propose that there are two underlying reasons for
Singapore’s early response and early public awareness strategy. One being their experiences from
dealing with SARS and MERS outbreak, the other one being the fact that Singapore is an
international transportation hub. These factors may have led the country to plan its medical
resources early on, establish the emergent PHCPs, and develop a completely new software to use
as the contact tracing method for the whole country.

2.2.5 South Korea
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South Korea didn’t implement a country-wide lockdown or travel ban that is as stringent
as many of the other Asian countries or regions (Park, Choi, and Ko, 2020). However, they still
seem to achieve an impressive result by almost flattening the curve in late March. Scholars have
attributed this success to mostly the ability of massive testing earlier than many other countries,
the public-private partnerships (PPP), and the effective contact tracing mechanism proposed by
the South Korean government. Park and Chung (2021) discussed about the availability of RealTime Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR) testing in South Korea, which is enabled by their past
experiences dealing with MERS outbreak in 2015. With the technology available, the government
has also utilized the existence of PPP to help with mass producing the testing kits, hence
streamlining the whole process. On top of that, Park, Choi, and Ko (2020) proposed that the use
of information technology-based tracing strategies in South Korea has helped the government to
track down the close contacts of infected or suspected individuals quickly and effectively. More
specific details about the technology-based contact tracing method will be discussed in the section
below.
The other interesting aspect noted by a few different scholars is the high obedience of South
Korean people during pandemics (Lee and You, 2020). They argue for a concept of “social
learning”, which means a stream of effective information sharing, public education, and timely
implementation of public health policies. Raising public awareness is important, especially at the
beginning of the disease outbreaks so that people can better protect themselves and obey the
guidelines from the government (Lee and You, 2020). Furthermore, scholars have attributed the
high obedience of people to the collective memory that South Korea has about public health crisis
in recent history (Park and Chung, 2021). Since South Korea has been in multiple similar public
health crisis including the recent ones like the SARS and MERS, the people have learned to adapt
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to the policy changes in pandemics time and react every faster than the official government policies.
Therefore, the use of RT-PCT testing, the information technology-based contact tracing method,
and the high obedience of citizens together tamed the COVID growth in South Korea effectively.

2.2.6 Taiwan
In fact, the very first few papers about COVID policy responses actually focus on Taiwan,
since Taiwan generally have the number of cases stabilized by that point and the world seems to
agree that Taiwan has been controlling COVID spread very well. In general, Taiwan is deemed to
have leveraged its experiences of dealing with SARS, used their robust public health systems,
received supports from multiple health industries, and spread the public awareness early on, which
all contributed to their impressive response to COVID-19 (Lin et al, 2020). Specifically, since the
SARS pandemics in 2003, Taiwan has established the National Health Command Center (NHCC)
that focuses on disaster management and large-scale disease outbreaks (Wang, Ng, and Brook,
2020). During the COVID crisis, NHCC responded immediately and identified the crisis very early
on starting January 15th. Taiwan called for alerts of travelers from China in early January, which
was before any health emergent status was announced in mainland China. Furthermore, Taiwan
was clear about its priority to contain local transmission. To do so, Taiwan government leveraged
the strength of their national health database to track the travel history of its residents and to
identify the vulnerable populations (Wang, Ng, and Brook, 2020). They even proactively seek out
patients with prior respiratory issues and mark them as special groups to look out for.
Taiwan has been more detailed on many aspects in terms of their policy responses. For
contact tracing, Taiwan focuses on closes contacts of index cases— people who did not wear
appropriate personal protection equipment (PPE) while having face-to-face contact with a

29

confirmed case for more than 15 minutes during the investigation period. All close contacts are
required to quarantine at home for 14 days and will be tested for relevant symptoms regularly
(Cheng et al 2020). In order to better complement their contact tracing, at the meantime, Taiwan
also developed and produced the testing kits by adapting from the existing ones (Lin et al, 2020).
Beyond the public health measures, the health care system itself in Taiwan seems to be prepared
for coping with disease outbreaks. Lin et al (2020) argues that the National Health Insurance
system has facilitated the effective response as well. Not only did it contain specific information
about patient history and disease surveillance, it also ensures that checking for potential COVID
infection is affordable in many different clinics and hospitals.
Overall, Taiwan has received very positive comments on their COVID response strategies
as they quickly mobilized and instituted approaches for case identification, resource allocation,
testing development, and utilization of their databased to identify the vulnerable groups. Many
authors have attributed this policy response to their experiences of SARS from 2003 and the wellestablished health care system in the region.

2.2.7 Zhejiang Province
Zhejiang Province is deemed to have one of the best records of containing COVID-19.
Authors attribute the success of Zhejiang Province to two main strategies—1) The effectiveness
of community-based organizations, and 2) The early adoption of the health code system (Cheng,
Yu, Shen, and Huang 2020). Note that Zhejiang Province actually has one of the highest numbers
of imported cases from Hubei Province both given its high population density and proximity
between the provinces (Wang and Tenuis, 2020). The containment of community spread of
COVID-19 is therefore more impressive under this context. Community-based organizations are
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those grassroot level organizations either initiated by volunteers in different districts or the existing
ones such as the charitable organizations and community service organizations, some even involve
private business organizations. They are believed to help with mobilizing the resources quickly
throughout the province, voluntarily tracking that people wear proper respiratory equipment when
in the public spaces, and even motivated the use of digital tracking systems to better cope with the
pandemics. Figure 1 below shows a more detailed description from Cheng, Yu, Shen, and Huang
(2020) about the specific roles that each player in the community-based organizations have played
in Zhejiang.
Furthermore, since the headquarter of Alibaba is located in Zhejiang Province, the
experimental trials with the health code systems actually initiated in China (Cheng, Yu, Shen, and
Huang 2020). The similar health code systems are later adopted to almost all provinces in China
and it is believed that the early and more stringent use of health code systems in Zhejiang may
have contributed to the effective response. Therefore, by utilizing the strength of different public
and private organizations in Zhejiang and adapting to the health code systems early, Zhejiang
Province is believed to achieve an impressive result regardless the high number of imported cases.
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(Figure 1. The role of different community-based organizations in Zhejiang. Cheng, Yu, Shen,
and Huang 2020)

2.2.8 Synthesis and Comparison
Drawing from the various literatures on different geographical locations, the author
synthesized some preliminary insights and findings. From the descriptions from other scholars in
the field, we can already identify some similarities and differences in the different policies and
evaluations of policies in these regions.

32

To start with common takeaways, it seems like multiple scholars agreed that many of these
places have learned from their past experiences dealing with other infectious disease outbreaks.
Out of these regions, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Guangdong Province were
among the ones having more experiences dealing with similar issues. Second, public education
and raising awareness of the disease seems to be a ubiquitous strategy across different places.
Third, since most of these regions are either have a large volume of travelers between the place to
the hotspot Wuhan (e.g., Henan Province, Zhejiang Province, and Guangdong Province), or are
international transportation hubs (e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea), traveler
screenings and travel restrictions are mostly observed relatively early on in these places.
However, there are also many unique strategies that are only seen in one or a few places.
For example, it seems that Singapore is the only place that stressed about strategies in hospitals
and emergent clinics. Second, Hong Kong and Zhejiang Province seem to emphasize the roles of
community-based organizations and the help from the grassroot activists in containing COVID.
Third, Taiwan and Guangdong Province are the only regions that emphasize that the health care
capacity, health care provision, and effect of health insurance on the COVID responses. Fourth,
both South Korea and Taiwan have attributed their ability to flatten the curve to their fast
development and manufacturing of the testing kits. Both places actually managed to start very
early by adapting the testing kits they’ve used from dealing with previous health care crisis. Lastly,
South Korea focuses on public-private partnerships (PPP) and how PPP enables the country to
manufacture massive testing kits effectively. Similar cooperation between the public and the
private sectors is also alluded to in the discussion of Zhejiang Province by Cheng, Yu, Shen, and
Huang (2020). One caveat is that it is possible that other places also implemented these unique
strategies, but they just haven’t been picked up by the academic field yet.
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While these studies provide a good overview of policies on specific Asian countries or
areas, there are a few research gaps in the current academic field. Namely, there is a lack of lateral
comparisons and relative evaluation of these regions, and the studies focus solely on the public
health prevention measures but ignoring other important factors influencing decision-making and
policy outcomes, and some articles seem to contain a strong political preference. Additionally, it’s
important to note that the literature analyzed above are those published no later than October 2020,
meaning that the data many authors used are from the earlier phases and potentially different time
periods of study. The author will address these concerns using the described methods below, to
control for the time period of analysis and initial imports from the hotspots. The author will also
compare and contrast the results from more quantitative data to the more qualitative and descriptive
results presented above.

2.3 Emerging Disease in the Age of Digital Technology and Social Media
One interesting aspect of COVID-19 is that with technological advancement and
widespread Internet use in the world, innovative methods of contact tracing and monitoring that
were only theoretical in the past now becomes viable. Many of these new methods are adopted by
various countries to identify the infected people and their close contacts more closely.
For example, South Korea has developed and utilized a special information technologybased tracing approach starting in February. This customized app requires the quarantined
individuals to report their health status on a regular basis, and, with aggregated location data,
modeling efforts were also made to locate potential sources of community-acquired infections
(Park, Choi, and Ko, 2020). Importantly, this method does not only track the currently infected
individuals closely, but also monitor early the close contacts of those infected individuals, even
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though most of them did not show any symptoms. A further explanation of the flow of the
information and the relevant agencies in charge is shown in the Figure 2 below. More interestingly,
it was discussed that such approach was invented during the MERS spread in 2015 and was
upgraded for COVID use (Park, Choi, and Ko, 2020). This aligns with other literatures from
section one that countries with more experiences dealing with past pandemics may have a better
coping strategy and will prepare earlier for the potential threats. As a result, amid relatively slack
border controls or lockdown policies as many other Asian countries, Park, Choi, and Ko (2020)
argued that the use of such IT-based technology has contributed largely to flattening the curve of
newly confirmed cases and deaths starting from mid-March. They reached the conclusion by
roughly comparing the pre-tracking versus post-tracking period in South Korea. However, the
author foresees some issues with the method as other conditions may have changed as well as time
progresses, and Park, Choi, and Ko (2020) didn’t provide a good control method.

(Figure 2. COVID-19 tracking system in South Korea. Park, Choi, and Ko, 2020)
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Similar use of IT-based strategies has been observed in other areas of study. For example,
the use of a Bluetooth tracker called TraceTogether in Singapore and the innovative “health code”
in China to record the basic health status of people. To explain further, Singapore Ministry of
Health has launched the app TraceTogether on March 20, 2020, to keep track of the proximity data
for ever app user and alert people if they have been in close contacts within some infected
individuals within the last two weeks (Singapore Govt Official Website). The advantage to the
technology is that it tracks your relative proximity with every individual that’s been within to you
without knowing your exact location in order to protect your privacy. Furthermore, it also records
the duration of the contact with others. Many times, people aren’t aware of all the individuals
they’ve encountered in the past two weeks, especially when you are just crossing the street or
taking a public transportation somewhere, and this app remembers the data for you for up to two
weeks. A month after the initial launch, it shows an adoption rate over 20% with 1 million people
downloading it. Many authors seem to agree that the adoption of the app contributes to the effective
flattening of the curve in Singapore (Baharudin and Wong, 2020). Only a few weeks after the
initial launch of the app, Singapore became the imagination of many other countries, such as
Australia, and many other governments tried to adopt a similar strategy (Goggin, 2020).
China also took on the benefits of digital technology and came up with the innovation of
“health code” in early February. By cooperating with WeChat, the government generates unique
QR code for every user and use it to indicate the basic health status of the patients. People have to
self-report their body temperatures and the existence of any relevant symptoms. “Green code”
means you are healthy and low risk, “yellow code” means you are a close contact of some infected
individuals and are classified as medium risk, and “red code” means you are an infected person
(Liang, 2020). A visualization of the three different kinds of health code is provided below in
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Figure 3 and 4. Starting in late February, the “health code” becomes necessary for almost all
aspects of people’s life in China. For example, only people with the “green code” are allowed to
take public transportation and enter a commercial building (Smith, 2020). Beyond health code,
PRC and many local governments also provide data on the potential places that any infected
individuals haven been to in the past two weeks on a publicly available platform. More specifically,
there are data on the whereabouts of identified patients, including the public transportation they’ve
taken during the past 14 days and even specific regions, streets, and supermarkets they’ve been to
(Shevchenko 2020). “Health code” and information-sharing proved its effectiveness by allowing
China to reopen very early in the spring and haven’t seen much of a surge ever since.

(Figure 3. Health code system in China. Liang, 2020)
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(Figure 4. Zhejiang health code. Cheng, Yu, Shen, and Huang 2020)
Beyond the use of digital technology, the widespread coverage of Internet throughout the
world in the last 20 years has generated incomparable attention on social media channels. The
existence of multiple social media platforms enabled the faster distribution of information and the
ability for researchers to capture sentiments from the people. After the SARS pandemic, it has
already come to the scholar’s attention that the use of social media in the future could help reduce
the risks of infectious disease outbreaks and be used as a channel for announcing policy changes
(Smith, 2006). To start with information circulation, official national and local governments will
post regular updates of confirmed case numbers and patient statuses on social medias, so that it is
easier for the general public to monitor and discuss the COVID conditions own regions (Galinski
and Menachery 2020). Some platforms such as WeChat in China also serves local feeds on newly
published policies and case updates depending on the specific geographic locations. Furthermore,
platforms such as the John’s Hopkins COVID tracker and many others are publicly accessible to
people all around the world, providing people with more sources of cross validation. Many new
guidelines from WHO or national governments are also updated almost simultaneously on these
platforms, allowing for real-time information transmission to all citizens.
Beyond the convenience of sharing information with people on different social media
platforms, these platforms also be used as channels of which people express their opinions and
feelings toward the government response policies. Smith (2006) argued that the media
representation of the disease is important for people’s perceptions and reactions to changes in
government policies. It will be easy for the government to track how local residents responded to
a new quarantine policy for example. Since people’s sentiments may indicate how effective the
policies can be, it may motivate the government to modify their policies based on people’s
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reactions. Not only can people’s sentiments be shown on the social media platforms, people also
tend to share their personal experiences and stories within the pandemics. This move may provide
first-hand information about the current status in the hospital, mobilize grassroots movements as
discussed in the last section, and reflect the “normal life” for people in COVID. Combining all the
informatioin can potentially be helpful in gaining additional insights into the qualitative aspect of
how effective are the government response policies. Therefore, as Gralinski and Menachery (2020)
argued, while far from perfect, the government response to COVID-19 opens up new channels of
policy interactions and seemed to have a better outcome comparing to the results from SARS
outbreak just 17 years ago.
However, in spite the enthusiasm around the use of innovative digital technologies to
combat infectious disease and the power of social media to distribute important information more
effectively, there remain a few challenges with the use of such methods. First, as Park, Choi, and
Ko (2020) noticed, even though the tracking was very effective, there were many privacy
controversies surrounding such detailed recording of the information. As the app will reveal some
very sensitive personal information, certain individuals may be disdained once others find out they
were infected or have been in close contacts (Park, Choi, and Ko, 2020). For some residents in
Singapore, they didn’t download the TraceTogether app because they were worried that their
private information might be used for other purposes by the government. Similarly, the health code
system and information-sharing strategy has caused many troubles for citizens in China. Some
criticized that the type of information published on the public platform (i.e. the whereabouts, the
proximal living area, and hospitals they’ve been to) is too detailed and people could easily identify
the person even without a published name (Liang, 2020). Additionally, arguments and disdains
have been seen that people would blame the infected individuals for spreading the virus etc.
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Therefore, to better use the digital technologies in the future, it is very important for the
government to consider the privacy issues and unintended consequences for people.
Second, as sentiments from the public become more transparent to the government during
the pandemic times, one may suspect that these sentiments may indirectly affect government’s
decision-making process. In other words, government may try to issue policies that will align with
what most people are hoping for, but not with the best interest of containing the pandemics.
However, whether these virtual “interferences” from the public bring positive or negative effects
remains unknown and more studies are required in this field. Furthermore, there’s concerns about
the validity of the information that people pose on social media. Without a comprehensive
checking system, it’s likely that people will be spreading fake news about government policies on
the Internet, which may hinder the effectiveness of policy responses. Therefore, even though the
advancements in technology can provide potentially more effective response measures, we have
to be cautious about the privacy issues and the unintended consequences from using social media
overflow.

2.4 What’s Lacking in the Current Literature?
Although the aforementioned literature has provided solid context to analyze pandemics
response policy, there are a few considerations lacking from these authors and will be addresses
in this research study.
To start with past pandemics response literatures, even though they serve as good proxies
for COVID analysis, the fact that every infectious disease outbreak is different and that the world
faces with different social, political, and economic considerations may complicate the factor.
Beyond the problems with the methods of study discussed in the section above (i.e. lack of timeline
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control, lack of considerations for other influencing factors, and lack of quantitative analysis),
there are two additional considerations with regard to the past pandemic response literatures. First,
the world has not been that connected compared to 20 years ago, we should be able to address the
new challenges coming from the more than ever interconnected globe. As people’s travel pattern
and societies’ normal operations change, there may be a new focus of the pandemics study and
best practices for the political institutions. Second, the advancement of technologies and medical
studies may have changed the dynamics of dealing with pandemics. To take a few examples, the
changes in the social media usage and making the relevant data more publicly available is different
from what we observed in the past. Additionally, the advancement in telemedicine, for instance,
may have lowered the likelihood of people going to hospitals during pandemics time, and hence
reducing the risk of transmissions in hospitals. These changes in societal structures, should caution
the author that some preliminary results from SARS pandemics responses may not be applicable
under current situations. SARS policy responses seem to suggest that there is a lack of
communication methods to spread the risks of SARS to residents in the country early on, but this
may not be true in the context of COVID in the era of Internet and social media.
Then onto the newly published COVID literatures, even though they analyzed rather
comprehensively on their selected area of interests, there are a few things lacking according to the
author’s opinion. First, there is a lack of lateral comparisons between regions. For example, papers
that praised the policy measures in Zhejiang Province and Henan Province never compared itself
to other provinces. Or rather, the comparison is limited to a small area. The authors mainly looked
at whether other provinces in China were doing the similar things, but no comprehensive
comparisons were given. This could cause trouble because a lack of a comparative study makes it
harder to judge on a relative scale whether the policy responses were effective. Additionally, the
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author noticed that most of the recent COVID policy researches emphasize solely on the public
health prevention measures, such as contact tracing and quarantine measures. Though public health
measures may be arguably the most important influencers of the effectiveness of the pandemic
response, there are other factors that can’t be ignored in order to grasp the full picture of the
effectiveness of pandemic response. More potential factors will be addressed in the Hypotheses
section below. Thirdly, some of the papers seem to be written with a strong political bias towards
certain government agencies. For example, the Hartley and Jarvis (2020) paper seems to have a
strong objection to the measures taken by mainland Chinese government and attributed the distrust
to the Hong Kong government by local people to earlier events. These political biases may have
led the authors to bias their opinions in the COVID policy response analyses.
Nevertheless, these current literatures provided a good overview of the current conditions.
The consensus from the scholars have generally been positive, meaning that many are focused on
analyzing the positive aspects of the COVID control outcomes. However, since most of the
evidence is descriptive, it’s hard to make preliminary comparisons at this point. Although it does
seem like Zhejiang Province and Henan Province are the best amongst these regions due to their
fast to actions and the cooperative attitudes from the public.
On common problem among all literatures so far is the lack of direct policy suggestions to
the countries or regions of study. As stressed in the previous section, this paper truly aims to foster
the institutional changes so that the government can better prepare for future disease outbreaks.
While the current literature provides good summary of the policies and even evaluations of policies,
most of them didn’t provide explicit policy suggestions. For those that did provide policy
suggestions, not enough information is given on how to measure the success of those policy
suggestions in the future, nor did they advocate for the importance that different national
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governments need to be aware of their mistakes in the past. Therefore, this study is going to address
the problem by providing explicit policy suggestions based on the data analyses results and is
going to advocate, along with similar researches, that such information should be shared with
policymakers and health care providers. To address these challenges and fill in the academic area,
the author proposes the following hypotheses and methods of analysis to proceed with the research
study.

3. HYPOTHESES
Based on motivation of the study and insights from the current literatures, the author
proposes several hypotheses to answer the questions of what leads to the disparities of COVID-19
outcomes. There are five proposed hypotheses, which are broken into two primary hypotheses and
three secondary ones, that could explain the differences in COVID policy outcomes. These
hypotheses were formulated from observations from past literatures and a comprehensive
understanding of the problem statement itself. Due to the time constraints and the difficulty to
control for other confounding variables, this research will prioritize the two primary hypotheses
on 1) the public health prevention measures that were in place in different regions, and 2) the
preparedness of the health care systems. The three secondary hypotheses—economic development
level, demographics, and past experiences dealing with infectious disease outbreaks—will also be
incorporated in the data analysis model to test for their significance. A more in-depth explanation
of the five hypotheses is provided below.

3.1 Preparedness of the Public Health System
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The first and perhaps the most important hypothesis is what public health prevention
measures were actually in place in these regions and when were these measures ordered. The
influences of these public health measures are expected to be two-fold. On one hand, whether those
prevention measures were enforced, suggested, or not in place will play an important role into
understanding the effectiveness of policy response. On top of that, how early were those public
health prevention guidelines published by the government might also have an impact. The most
important public health measures in the context of COVID-19 are contact tracing and quarantine
measures. While some measures may be common across the board, such as the 14-day quarantine
requirement for close contacts with infected individuals, many unique prevention measures were
observed in these regions. To take Singapore as an example, Singapore’s Ministry of Health has
mandated the use of a Bluetooth tracker called TraceTogether to record proximity and duration of
an encounter between two users starting in late March and early April. This information is then
used to identify close contacts when a person is found to be COVID-19 positive (Singapore
Government Official Website). Another unique public health response measure is observed in
Zhejiang Province. Cheng et al (2020) noted in their case study in Zhejiang Province that the
appearances of community-based grassroot organizations may have contributed to the effective
containment of COVID in their province, making Zhejiang having one of the best COVID record
in China.
It is hypothesized that different public health measures may have different levels of impacts.
Some measures may be more effective than others or the combinations of some measures may
outperform the single measures. For example, it is reasonable to speculate that the contact tracing
works more effectively in conjunction with the strict quarantine measures of infected individuals.
Each of the widely used public health prevention measures will be recorded and transform into a
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categorical variable for analysis. Furthermore, it is also expected that the earlier those measures
were in place, the better the effectiveness of the response. This projection is based off the logistic
growth nature of the infectious disease, such that the number of cases may grow very significantly
in the lack of an early intervention.
In order to test for this hypothesis, a qualitative discussion of what public health prevention
measures were in place in different regions, and a quantitative assessment of each prevention
measures, along with a categorization of early, intermediate, and late for the timing of those
measures, will be carefully documented and analyzed in the sections below.

3.2 Health Care Systems and Available Resources
The second primary hypothesis is how prepared is the local health care systems for such a
big-scale global health care crisis. The preparedness of the health care systems refer, in general, to
the amount of available medical resources and the ability for the local government to deploy those
resources as needed. More specifically, it incorporates the following aspects. First, the amount of
medical available resources per capita, including the physician-patient ratios, number of hospital
beds, and the capacity of each hospital, is important. It predicts the total and average amount of
resources each government has and the ability for the government to mobilize those resources as
soon as possible. Second, where are the health care facilities located within the region may also
affect the effectiveness of policy response. If a region has an unbalanced distribution of health
facilities, it may be harder for some patients to access than the other, leading to a less effective
result. Third, the process that patients have to do though in order to be treated as a COVID patient
is essential. Starting from how can a potential patient be tested and reported, which departments
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within the hospitals that patients need to visit, and leading to how should patients pay for the
services to get treated, can all be influential of how well COVID spread can be controlled.
It is hypothesized that regions with more available health resources per capita and more
accessible health care facilities will have a better policy response. Although some areas of studies
are close in geographic proximity and some are under the same national government (i.e., PRC),
disparities in their health systems exist. For example, Hong Kong and mainland China, though
close in proximity, have different levels of primary care access and qualities (Wei et al 2015).
Furthermore, it also depends on the resource allocation within the regions. Some regions may have
more preemptive measures to reserve the hospital beds for potential COVID patients even before
the spike of the diseases, and this is hypothesized to contribute to the effective COVID response
policies. Hospitals in Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have been observed to take early actions
to reallocate their medical resources starting in early January (Wong et al 2020 & Wang et al 2020),
which was before the appearance of first COVID cases in these regions. In previous infectious
disease outbreaks, scholars have also found similar patterns that a timely response to reallocate
medical resources can be crucial to the success of disease containment (Schwartz and Evans 2007).
In order to test for this hypothesis, both qualitative description of different health care
systems and people’s experiences within the systems, and the quantitative data analysis of whether
the amount of medical resources per capital is correlated with the outcome metrics of this study,
will be carefully documented and analyzed below.

3.3 Secondary Hypotheses
Beyond the two primary hypotheses, there are three secondary hypotheses that need to be
addressed in this research. The overall strength of the economy, the demographics data, and the

46

different levels of experiences of dealing with past pandemics may be correlated with the
effectiveness of response policies. These considerations may serve as additional variations in the
models to be described below and by controlling some of these variables, we may be able to better
project the relationships between the effectiveness of government response policies and the two
primary hypotheses mentioned above.
To explain each of the hypotheses further, the economic development level of each of the
country/region is shown to have correlation with the available medical resources and the awareness
of the local government to prepare for the pandemics (Lam et al 2020). Many researches have
concluded that the economic development of a country is predictive of the strength of the health
care systems in that country, and hence correlated with the medical resources a place can deploy
during a pandemic. The economic development of a region may also be correlated with the
awareness of the government and the general public to follow the guidelines of the public health
prevention measures. Therefore, it is worth analyzing whether the variations of the economic
development contribute to the disparities we observe in outcomes.
Demographics data include age and gender structures, the population density, and the level
of urbanization. Because the demographics of this study may be hard to control due to the
heterogeneity of the regions, it is therefore critical to take a snapshot of the overall demographics
to either there’s not much of a difference in these metrics, or we can evaluate whether these
differences in demographics contribute to the differences in outcomes that we observed. If, for
example, two regions have similar population density and age structures, but one place has a better
outcome than the other, it may indicate that some other factors are predictive of the effectiveness
of policy response. On the other hand, if two places have similar health care systems and public
health prevention measures, but different demographics and different COVID control outcomes,
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we may be able to draw inferences between the demographics and the effectiveness of the response
policy.
The last hypothesis builds upon the experiences that different government bodies have
regarding past health care crisis, especially the most recent ones such as SARS, MERS, and Ebola.
It has come to the attention of many scholars, including Hartley & Jarvis (2020), Zhang et al (2020),
Wang et al (2020), and Mei (2020), that regions that were more affected by SARS and MERS in
the past seem to have a quicker and more accurate response of COVID. They concluded multiple
reasons for this phenomenon. First, the scholarly field seems to agree that regions that were hit by
past pandemics were more alerted of the potential threats, and that’s why regions such as Taiwan
and Guangdong Province started preparing their medical staff even before the first case was
identified (Mei 2020 & Zhang et al 2020). Second, regions with past pandemics experiences have
some spare space in the hospitals and have remained training guidelines about how to prevent cross
infections in the hospitals, leading to a more immediate response (Wong 2020). Additionally, past
experiences dealing with pandemics may make these regions ahead of others in terms of
developing innovative measures for contact tracing and quick identification of susceptible
populations, hence better protecting its population. All these proposed reasons could be valid,
although subjective to further analysis by this research. To understand exactly how much
experiences each of these regions have, the author is going to categorize each region into “Low”,
“Medium”, and “High” in terms of its experience, using data such as the ones Ahmed et al (2009)
proposed. Hence, by understanding the level of experiences these regions have about coping with
pandemics may further shed light on the effectiveness of the COVID response policies.

4. DATA AND METHODS
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This section will start with an explanation of how the author collected both primary and
secondary data, and potential biases by using these datasets. Then the author is going to show in
detail about the collected data for the metrics of measurements, i.e., the output variables, and the
independent variables, i.e., the input variables. A preliminary analysis of the output and input
variables will be analyzed to show preliminary insights. Lastly, the author is going to describe a
detailed analysis plan that will help us connect the output variable with the input variables. All of
the models have been experimented by the author and the results and discussion of such is included
in the next section.

4.1 Data Collection
This research relies heavily on both primary data and secondary data collections. The
author recognizes the risk that some of the related data may not be as accurate at the start of the
pandemics, as it is usual the case that these data are adjusted even years after the pandemics.
Nevertheless, the author tries to avoid this issue by collecting some primary sources by herself and
validate certain sources across different platforms. The primary data collection focuses on the
actual public health prevention measures that were in place for these regions, namely the contact
tracing, quarantine requirements, and health codes from government policies. These resources are
mostly collected through primary channels, including following and searching different official
government websites to extract the policies and the dates of the policy implementation. Since there
are many detailed policies in place from January through mid-May, the author chose to record
those that are deemed most important and impactful by judgement. The focus of the public health
measures is also on the policies that are unique to these regions and focus less on the ones that are
common across the board. Most of the primary data collection is validated by comparing with the
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data used in other COVID policy research paper that focuses on a specific area. Primary data is
presented in the Figure 5 below. Note that this is only a preliminary representation of the data
collection and more details are added later in the data analysis and in the qualitative evidence
section below. More information on the sources and explanation of the data is in Appendix A.

(Figure 5. Primary data collection examples, changes were made later on)
Secondary data collection relies on sources that have already been published. The output
metrics will be collected mostly through the secondary channels as no primary collection of largescale COVID data is possible for the author. These data (i.e., the number of identified cases and
deaths, the dates of the first identified case, and etc.) will be collected through multiple platforms
including World Health Organizations (WHO), Our World in Data, and the John’s Hopkins
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COVID tracker, to ensure consensus. Although there may be discrepancies in how each region
categorize the cases and collected their data, since we are looking over a period of few months,
the biases should remain constant in the data collection methods and hence have a lesser effect on
the accuracy of the overall data.
For the input variables, the secondary resources will be important for both qualitative and
quantitative data. For the qualitative data, the author is going to use literatures that describe the
different health care systems as the supporting evidence for the first hypothesis. Furthermore, a
special kind of qualitative data, namely people’s sentiments towards the health systems and the
public health prevention measures, is going to be collected through multiple news channels and
websites. As mentioned before, a broader view of the story of the people is important as it
potentially speaks to the effectiveness of the response policy, and people’s willingness to cooperate
with the government under the emergent scenarios. Such data will be collected through news
outlets such as BBC, CNN, local news channels, and various social media platforms such as
Facebook and WeChat. For the quantitative data, the author is mainly going to collect the
demographics data and past experiences of these countries dealing with SARS. The demographics
data is going to be collected through the publicly available census website. The past experiences
of dealing with pandemics will be collected mostly through previous researches, as most of them
present a relatively comprehensive summary of the past pandemics. The author is then going to
translate the level of experiences each country has into a categorical variable with 3 levels: “Low”,
“Medium”, and “High”.
Both the primary and secondary data collection is dated at mid-May to ensure consistency
across the regions and to limit the scope of the analysis on the outcomes of COVID control in the
initial wave of COVID outbreak. The choice of the analysis period is explained in more detail in
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the “Problem Statement” section above. However, the author does recognize the limitation that
there are only a few observations and it may be hard to establish statistical significance. The small
number of variables is due to the fact that most of the policy-related data are hand-collected and
the analysis period is rather early. Therefore, the main goal with the amount of available data is to
factor out the most important factors influencing the disparities of COVID containment results.

4.2 Metrics of Measurements
It is not immediately clear what would be the most appropriate proxies to represent the
effectiveness of the government response policies. The author decides to try three kinds of
variables as the dependent variable in the model. The first option is using the growth rate of cases
in different regions, i.e., the average number of new cases per day. More specifics about how to
calculate this growth rate is provided below. The decision to focus on the growth rate is based off
the consideration to account for the different tracking methods for number of cases and deaths,
which may introduce different margins of errors (Leung et al 2020). Even though regions may
have different ways to count the number of cases, as long as the discrepancy is consistent within
the region, looking at the growth rate of the cases can minimize the disparities in counting methods.
To calculate the growth rate, the author decides to adjust for the initial number of imported
cases from the hotspot Wuhan. This is because the initial imported cases appeared in those regions
without the government knowing a lot about the pandemics and hence no policy was practically
possible to prevent the spread initially. Comparing the cases and growth rate with or without the
adjustment can be used as a test for the hypothesis that the initial imported cases were out of the
control by most local governments. By subtracting the initial imported cases, the author believes
that the data is more representative of how well the local government contains the virus locally
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and how policy responses help prevent the spread. There were more than 5 million people travelled
from Wuhan to other cities before the city lockdown order on January 23rd, 2020 (Song et al 2020)
and where those people went could have a significant impact on the initial number of imported
cases in different regions. To account for the fact that many of the initial cases were imported from
Wuhan, Hubei during the Chinese New Year travel upsurge, the author is going to calculate the
growth rate of the number of cases using the cumulative cases minus the imported number and
then divide by the time period in days. For example, it is estimated that Henan Province has an
initial of 398 import of cases from Wuhan (Song et all 2020, Health Commission of Henan
Province). Up to mid-May, there has been a total of 1276 cases identified. The growth rate of
COVID cases in Henan is going to be calculated using 1276 minus 398, and then divided by the
number of days elapsed between the first case and May 11th. This method is justified because after
the city lockdown in Hubei Province since January 23rd, nearly no people could leave the province
and enter other places and hence we can attribute future growth within these regions to be the
consequences of within-region policy responses. Furthermore, using this method also addresses
the concern about varying distances to the hot spot. Even though these regions are of different
distances to Wuhan, since no travel between the hotspots and other places were possible until April,
by accounting for the initial number of imported cases from Wuhan, we have controlled for the
variability of different distances to Wuhan.
However, the first option remains the bias that different regions have different demographic
structures, which could lead to different population density, age structure, an etc. These concerns
are addressed by the second option proposed. The second option is going to be the growth rate of
cases adjusted by the population to reach the average number of new cases per 100,000 people in
the region. All else equal as the first option, the author is going to use all the statistics adjusted by
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the total populations in the region. Note that the direct data of population adjusted cases is
unavailable in some regions of studies. Given this constraint, the author decided to work from the
number of cases and the total population of the regions to calculate the per 100,000 people case
numbers manually.
The third option that the author is going to attempt is the number of cumulative deaths in
those regions, divided by the total number of cases identified. This decision is based off the concern
that the number of deaths may be representative of how well the health care system deals with
public health crisis and what care was provided to the COVID patients. Figure 6 highlights all
three metrics of measurements variables from primary data collection. It’s not hard to notice that
the number of deaths in all these regions seem to be fairly low. Even adjusted by the total number
of cases, the percentages of death rate in the regions remain extremely low. Hence, the author
preliminarily concludes that using the death rates in these regions may not be the best
representative of the effectiveness.

(Figure 6. Metrics of Measurements/Dependent Variables Summary)
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Considering the different scales of the numbers and the large variations observed, the
author also decides to transform the dependent variables to categorical variables. The categorical
variable might also be helpful because there are only 8 observations and predicting a linear model
based on very few numbers of observations may be difficult. Therefore, the author provides cutoffs to categorize all three different dependent variables. More information on how the cut-off
points are chosen is described in the Appendix C. Note that the in the actual regression model, the
categories are transformed in the following way——Low: 1; Medium: 2; High: 3.

(Figure 7. Categorical Metrics of Measurements/Dependent Variable Summary)
It is helpful to provide some preliminary data visualization of the metrics of measurements
to observe any abnormalities. Overall, it seems like Singapore is the outlier among all the regions.
In the analysis below, the author tested the data with and without the Singapore observations.
Figure 8 shows the population adjusted cumulative cases of all regions and Figure 9 contains the
same information without Singapore. Figure 10 and 11 shows the growth rate (adjusted by
population), with and without Singapore respectively. From Figure 8 and 10, it can be observed
that Singapore has a very high number of cumulative cases (adjusted by population) and growth
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rate (adjusted by population). When excluding Singapore from other observations, we can see that
other places are on a more comparable scale of the output variables. This may indicate that
Singapore has the worst effectiveness of containing the spread of the virus from our metrics of
measurements. Additionally, the four provinces in China seem to achieve relatively similar
statistics despite their differences in demographic structures and local policies. This shows that
even though we wanted to separate out different provinces in China and expected these different
regions to have different levels of effectiveness, the preliminary results did indicate that these
regions tend to have similar outcomes.
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Cumulative Case Per 100,000 People (w/o Singapore)
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Growth Rate Adjusted by Population (w/o
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(Figure 11. Population Adjusted Growth Rate without Singapore Observation)
Conversely, the death rate adjusted by number of cases seem to be relatively similar among
these regions and Singapore even have one of the lowest estimates regarding the death rate. Figure
12 indicates the death rate by number of cases in different regions. Do note that the absolute value
of the death cases is extremely low, as we can see from the data collection above in Figure 6. The
extremely low number of cases for deaths may make it less useful as an outcome variable. A more
commonly used metrics to compare the actual COVID death rate is looking at the “excess
mortality,” which is defined as the addition in mortality rates when compared to a normal year.
However, the author ultimately chose not to use the “excess mortality” because the provinciallevel data was not available for the provinces in China. This is the only dependent statistics that
Singapore doesn’t seem to stand out as an outlier. However, as mentioned in the previous section,
since the actual death cases are extremely low and the statistics are very similar, it may not be the
most appropriate metrics.
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Death Rate by Number of Cases
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(Figure 12. Death Rate Adjusted by Number of Cases)
One important message, however, is that we only have a total of 8 observations, which may
be the reason why Singapore stood out as an outlier from many other places. The small number of
observations we have may make it unsuitable to build a strong and indicative statistical model.
This point is further addressed below in the Limitation section

4.3 Independent Variables
For the independent variables, the author has transformed the five hypotheses above into
quantifiable variables to represent the data. The first three variables are continuous variables. GDP
per capita is directly taken from the 2019 data from secondary source. The level of medical
resources is proxied by the number of hospital beds per capital within the region. Number of unique
local level polices was summarized from the primary data collection and related literatures to see
whether the government has done something differently. Next, we have a categorical variable to
represent how early or late the government responds to the crisis. The timeliness of the response
was categorized into “Early”, “Medium”, and “Late” by combining the enacted dates of the policies
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and compared to each other on a relative scale. The last variable was transformed from the past
literatures into a numeric variable from the range of 0 to 3, with 0 being almost no experience to
3 being very familiar with the protocols. The information of the data came from Ahmed et al (2009)
and other newly published literatures that commented on the SARS and MERS control experience
of these regions. Figure 13 below provides a summary of the different independent variables
explored in this research.

(Figure 13. Independent Variables Summary)
Similar to the metrics of measurements, the author has considered the need to transform
some of the independent variables into categorical ones. Specifically, the GDP per capita data and
the available medical resources are transformed based on threshold cut-offs. Note that the in the
actual regression model, the categories are transformed in the following way——Low: 1; Medium:
2; High: 3——for GDP per capita and medical resources. The categories are transformed——
Early: 1; Medium: 2; Late: 3——for the timeliness of policy response. More information on how
the cut-off points is chosen is described in the Appendix C below. The other two variables stay as
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continuous variables, because all these variables are within a relatively small range and the author
decides that no transformation is needed. Figure 14 below provides a summary of the transformed
categorical variables.

(Figure 14. Categorical Independent Variables Summary)
The author has plotted all five of the independent variables for some visualizations. Figure
15-20 below represents the data for each one respectively, the blue charts represent continuous
variables whereas the orange charts represent categorical variables. Note that the experiences
dealing with SARS was originally thought to be a categorical variable, however, after
consideration, since the experiences are counted from the region’s recent encounters with
pandemics, it is actually additive and should be treated as a continuous variable.
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(Figure 15. GDP Per Capital (2019))
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(Figure 16. Categorical GDP Per Capital (2019))
Taking a closer look at Figure 17, it’s interesting to see that South Korea has almost
doubled the hospital beds per capita compared to many other regions whereas Singapore has
almost only half of the medical resources compared to the majority of these regions.
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Medical Resources (Hospital Beds Per Capita 2019)
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(Figure 17. Hospital Beds Per Capita (2019))
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2

Singapore

2

(Figure 18. Unique Local Level Policies)
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Timeliness of Policy Response
Beijing

3

Guangdong

1

Henan

1

Zhejiang

2

Hong Kong

2

Taiwan

1

South Korea

2

Singapore

3

(Figure 19. Timeliness of Policy Response——1: Early; 2: Medium; 3: Late)
Experiences with Past Pandemics
Beijing

2

Guangdong

2

Henan

1

Zhejiang

1

Hong Kong

3

Taiwan

2

South Korea

3

Singapore

3

(Figure 20. Past Experiences Dealing with Pandemics)
Overall, it’s interesting to observe that unlike the dependent variables, the independent
variables are not that different from each other except the large variable in GDP levels. Recall
from the last section that most of the outcome variables are very similar to each other, so perhaps
the similarity in some of the input variables can explain that. However, since the output variable
for Singapore is quite different from that of the others while the explanatory variables are very
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similar, it may indicate that there are other factors influencing the outcomes of the COVID control
in Singapore that is not captured in our data. Nevertheless, a more accurate conclusion can only
be given after we have fit our model for quantitative data analysis below.

4.4 Data Analysis Plans
To test the validity and soundness of each of the proposed hypotheses above, the author is
going to use a combination of qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods to provide
evidence. The author will start with qualitative data analysis by describing the different policies
and gathering sentiments from news articles and official press releases about how the general
public and the government officials felt about their COVID response policies. This will be
combined with some of the observations from other relevant papers that are discussed in the
Literature Review section. The quantitative data analysis will then focus on transforming each of
the proposed hypotheses into a quantitative representation and use regression to analyze whether
the input metrics can predict the outcome metrics.
Since there are two sets of data for both the dependent and independent variables. There
will be essentially four kinds of quantitative analysis approaches that the author is attempting with.
First, the author will start with continuous dependent variables and continuous independent
variables. Then, the author will use continuous dependent variables with categorical independent
variables. After that, the author will use both kinds of independent variables with categorical
dependent variables. Within each approach, the author experimented with three different metrics
of measurements (i.e., the dependent variables) separately to see how well the model is doing. For
all the models, the author will try to look at the two-by-two correlations (i.e., fitting each
explanatory variable to the output variable and see how significant the result is). The choice is
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based on the fact that with such a few numbers of observations, it is hard to establish a valid
multiple regression model. Hence, we want to look separately at how each variable is correlated
with the output variable and out of the ones that are statistically significant, which one can explain
the largest variation in the data. Figure 21-24 represents the four kinds of models respectively.
There are two caveats in our data analysis approach here. One is that for the “Medical
Resource” variable is that when it is transformed to categorical variable, it has a very small
variation among all data and hence is not useful in the model. Therefore, in the actual regressions,
only the GDP is transformed in the independent variables and medical resource is constantly kept
as the continuous variable. The other is that as mentioned before, because the outcome variables
for Singapore is very different from those of other regions, the author also tried fitting the model
without the observation of Singapore to see whether we can obtain a more powerful and accurate
model.

(Figure 21a. Growth Rate)
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(Figure 21b. Population Adjusted Growth Rate)

(Figure 21c. Death Rate by Number of Cases)
(Figure 21. Continuous dependent variable with continuous independent variable)

(Figure 22a. Growth Rate)
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(Figure 22b. Population Adjusted Growth Rate)

(Figure 22c. Death Rate by Number of Cases)
(Figure 22. Continuous dependent variable with categorical independent variable)

(Figure 23a. Growth Rate)
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(Figure 23b. Population Adjusted Growth Rate)

(Figure 23c. Death Rate by Number of Cases)
(Figure 23. Categorical dependent variable with continuous independent variable)

(Figure 24a. Growth Rate)
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(Figure 24b. Population Adjusted Growth Rate)

(Figure 24c. Death Rate by Number of Cases)
(Figure 24. Categorical dependent variable with categorical independent variable)
For each of the model, the author starts looking at the correlation of the output variable
with the explanatory variable separately. Then the author tries to fit single regression models when
appropriate. By observing the correlations between the output variable and explanatory variable
and the significance of the independent variables (i.e., the p-value) from the models, the author
then decides which are the variables that can explain the most variations in the data. Additionally,
the author also tries to compare out of the four approaches of using continuous vs. categorical
variables, which one will be most suitable within the context of this research. Even though there
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are many models involved in the process, the author hopes to either find some similarities between
the models (i.e., variable X predicts the outcome variable in different models) or find out which
model performs much better than the other and explains the potential underlying reasons.
Following these steps, the author hopes to identify the most important independent variable that
predicts the outcome of government response policies and answer the proposed hypotheses.

5. EVIDENCE AND DISCUSSIONS
After experimenting with the four different approaches, the author has concluded that using
the categorical outcome variable and continuous input variable shows the greatest statistical power
(i.e., the Model 8 as shown above). This is likely because the large variation in continuous
dependent variable is smoothed by the categorical variable while the variations in the input
variables are maintained. Especially given the fact that there are only very few observations with
relatively abundant number of variables, scaling them to a few numbers are more reasonable.
Additionally, models without the observation of Singapore are generally better than the one
including Singapore. This may be due to the previous suggestion that Singapore varies very much
in the dependent variables and without Singapore observation, the input variables can better
explain the outcome. This section is going to begin with a detailed analysis of the quantitative
evidence, followed by the qualitative evidence to see whether it agrees or disagrees with the results
from the quantitative part. Lastly, the author will summarize the most important insights from the
data.

5.1 Quantitative Evidence
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Across all the models, we find that the model is strongest (i.e., has the highest statistical
significance and best explanation power) when we use the population adjusted growth rate as the
dependent variable. This is almost true for all of the four approaches that we proposed, and it is
consistent with our previous assumption. The author thinks it is because the differences in
demographics may bias the data for Option 1 and that the death rate data is too low to show the
power of the model for Option 3. Therefore, the models that we choose to discuss below all have
the Option 2 (i.e., the population adjusted growth rate) as our dependent variable. Across four
types of models, using the categorical dependent variable and continuous independent variables
seem to fit the data the most. We will focus on discussing the results from Approach 3 (i.e., using
categorical outcome variable and continuous explanatory variables). The explanation will be
centered around the results with all 8 observations involved, with a slight discussion on the model
when excluding Singapore. The result of the models tested will be included in the Appendix D to
show why those approaches are not as appropriate as the one we select as our final model.

5.3 Approach 3—Categorical Dependent Variable and Continuous Independent Variables
We started finding the correlations between all the explanatory variables and the output
variable (i.e., population adjusted growth rate). Out of the five variables, the GDP per capita seems
to have the highest correlation (0.925) with population adjusted growth rate, followed by
experiences dealing with SARS (0.793), and timeliness of response (0.566). The amount of
available medical resources and number of unique local-level policies don’t seem to be that
correlated with the outcome variable with only a -0.144 and -0.147 correlation respectively. Figure
24 below shows the detail of the five correlation matrices. It does seem like from the initial analysis,

72

GDP per capita and experiences dealing with SARS are the most correlated and significant
variables to explain the output variable.

(Figure 25a. Correlation between GDP per capita and the population adjusted growth rate)

(Figure 25b. Correlation between available medical resources with the population adjusted
growth rate)

(Figure 25c. Correlation between number of unique local level polices and the population
adjusted growth rate)

(Figure 25d. Correlation between timeliness of response and the population adjusted growth rate)

(Figure 25e. Correlation between experience dealing and past pandemics with the population
adjusted growth rate)
As mentioned before, we subjected that the correlations may be stronger when we take out
the Singapore observation because it seems to be an outlier on the output variable end. After
experimenting, there are two correlations that are improved after dropping the Singapore
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observation. The correlation for medical resources changed from -0.144 to 0.566 and the
correlation for experience dealing with SARS has increased from 0.793 to 0.837. The other
variables either doesn’t show significant changes in the correlations or have decreased associations
(i.e., the correlation for timeliness of response has decreased from 0.566 to 0.258).

(Figure 26a. Correlation between available medical resources and the population adjusted growth
rate without Singapore observation)

(Figure 26b. Correlation between experience dealing with past pandemics and the population
adjusted growth rate without Singapore observation)
Overall, from the correlation analysis, the data concludes that the GDP per capita and the
experiences dealing with the past pandemics are most correlated with the output variable. The
timeliness of response is somewhat related to the outcome while the medical resource is only
somewhat related when we remove the Singapore observation. However, the number of unique
local level policies doesn’t seem to be correlated with the outcome metrics with or without the
Singapore observation.
We then confirmed our finding by looking at the single regression model with each of the
variables above to see whether these variables are significant and whether they can explain the
variations in the data. We found that variable that explains most of the variation is using GDP per
capita to predict the outcome, with an R squared value of 0.86 and a P-value of 0.00999. This
means that the GDP per capita value alone is able to explain 86% of the variation in the data and
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that the GDP per capita variable is highly significant. Since the coefficient for GDP per capita is
positive, this means that with more GDP per capita, we expect the regions to have a higher
population adjusted growth rate, meaning a less effective response. This is counterintuitive but
could be explained by the fact that countries with higher GDP per capita may be more connected
to other places and hence have a higher possibility of disease transmission. More explanations will
be provided in the Discussion section below.

(Figure 27. GDP per capita to predict the population adjusted growth rate)
Similarly, we find that experiences dealing with past pandemics also seems to be correlated
with the output variable with an R square of 0.628 and is statistically significant at 0.02 level. This
means that experiences dealing with past pandemics alone can explain 62.8% of the variations in
the data. On the other hand, timeliness of response doesn’t seem to explain a lot of variations on
its own, with an R square of 0.321 and the model is barely statistically significant at 0.15 level.
The results of the statistics models are shown in the Figure 28 and Figure 29 below respectively.

75

(Figure 28. Experience with past pandemics to predict the population adjusted growth rate)

(Figure 29. Timeliness of Response to predict the population adjusted growth rate)
Overall, our regression models confirm that these three variables seem to the most
important one in predicting the categorical outcomes. Similar results are achieved (i.e., these three
variables are the most significant ones in predicting the outcome variable) when excluding the
Singapore observation using the same model. The only major difference is that medical resources
went from being very insignificant (i.e., with a p-value of 0.733) to barely significant at 0.2 level.
However, the R square value is low, meaning that medical resources alone cannot explain much
of the variations in the data.
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(Figure 30. Available medical resources to predict the population adjusted growth rate without
Singapore observation)

5.2 Qualitative Evidence
Many of the qualitative evidence is already presented in the Literature Review and Data
and Method sections above as the secondary evidence showing what policies were in place for
each of these regions and what’s the general sentiments regarding those policies. The author
summarizes the important unique local level policies and when were these policies implemented
in Table 1 below to emphasize the policies that were taken into consideration for the context of
this research. Note that the data below comes from a combination of primary data collection and
secondary data collection from other articles. There will be no separate analysis on the qualitative
evidence as most of the sentiments and highlights are emphasized in the Literature Review sections
as the secondary resources. The qualitative evidence of the unique policies will be analyzed
together in the Discussion, Conclusions and Future Research Direction sections bellow.

Regions
Beijing

Policies
No entry to other residence areas (i.e., cannot visit family or friends). | Late
February, 2020
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Returners from other provinces must be quarantined for 14 days in a hotel |
Henan

January, 2020

Province

Public announcements and education on local cables and channels about the
information and updates about the disease | January, 2020
First highest-level of emergency response status, with measures including
checking temperatures, mask requirements, and building entry monitoring

Guangdong

quickly established (Zhang et al, 2020) | January, 2020

Province

Hospital provides free online consultation hotlines 24/7 to reduce the need for
people with minor illness going into the hospital (Zhang et al, 2020) | January,
2020
First implementation of Health Code and Zhejiang Health Code | February,
2020

Zhejiang

Multiple city-wise lockdown following the lockdown of Wuhan | Late January,

Province

2020
Government-encouraged community-based organizations to help with checking
quarantined individuals and demographics follow-up | Late January, 2020
Early travel restrictions and no-entry permitted to non-citizens (Lam et al,

Hong Kong

2020) | February, 2020
StayHomeSafe App to catch violators who broke the social distancing
requirements | February, 2020

Taiwan

Using big data and digital health records to identify susceptible individuals and
notify them in advance | January, 2020
Hospital resources re-allocations to segment the areas within the hospitals and
ensure enough operating rooms are reserved for COVID patients (Wong et al,

Singapore

2020) | Late January, 2020
Using TraceTogether to share information about new COVID alert using the
proximity data collected by Bluetooth | Late March, 2020

South

Mass testing requirements from the government (Park and Chung, 2021) | Early

Korea

February, 2020
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Using information technology to keep track of all quarantined individuals and
their close contacts | Early March, 2020
(Table 1. Unique local level policies for regions of interests)

5.3 Discussions
By observing the four different approaches above, we can compare and contrast to reach
some important insights. Overall, the model with categorical output variable and continuous input
variables shows the best significance and power. This is likely due to the fact that lack of adequate
observations makes continuous output variable harder to fit. Additionally, because Singapore
differs very much by the outcome variable, it may bias the linear regression to a large extent. This
can be proven by the fact that when we remove the observation of Singapore from both Approach
1 and Approach 2, the power and significance of the models improved drastically (can be seen in
the Appendix D below). The continuous input variable retains the variability in the data, especially
for the GDP per capita which varies quite a bit across these regions.
Across different models, it seems to be consistent that GDP per capita and experiences
dealing with past pandemics are the most significant variables to explain the variations in the
model. The timeliness of policy response is somewhat statistically significant. The other two
variables—medical resources and unique local-level policies—don’t seem to be correlated with
the output variable. Recall that the research has five proposed hypotheses, and we want to discuss
what our results imply about these hypotheses below.

5.3.1 Hypothesis 1—Preparedness of the Public Health System
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The preparedness of the public health system is measured together by the number of unique
local level policies and the timeliness of response. Overall, while the number of unique local level
policies is not indicative of the outcome, the timeliness of response seems to be a relatively
important factor. The results for the timeliness of response are somewhat expected, because in the
context of a worldwide pandemics, the regions that are more alerted and are able to respond earlier
can contain the spread better. This conclusion confirms the theory that early response and early
action is important, especially in this more and more interconnected world.
However, it is unexpected that number of unique local level policies are not important for
models both including and excluding Singapore. This may be due to the lack of variations and a
small range of numeric numbers for this variable. Additionally, one thing that this research didn’t
take into account in the quantitative model is exactly what policies are in place in these regions.
Considering that what policies are in place may be more important than how many policies are in
place, our approach may be biased because it failed to understand this factor. Luckily, this is
somewhat addressed in the literature review and qualitative sections where the author summarizes
the exact policies in these different regions. However, it’s hard to draw correlations or even
causations just by looking at the qualitative evidence that we have, and hence the current
description of the policies lacks a lateral comparison power. This may be a good future direction
of research as to look into if adding a specific policy has a positive or negative impact on the
overall performance of the region in combating pandemics.

5.3.2 Hypothesis 2—Health Care System and Available Medical Resources
The health care system and available medical resources is modeled using the hospital beds
per capita. Out of all our approaches, the available medical resources itself don’t seem to correlate
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with the outcome variable. This is surprising to us because many would hypothesize that the
medical resources can be important in determining how much resources a country or a region has
and how much they can deploy at hand when the pandemics happen.
There may be two explanations for this result. First, these countries and regions seem to
have relatively adequate medical resources compared to many other countries and regions in the
world, and hence the available medical resources may not be the actual constraining factor in
dealing with the pandemics, at least in what we’ve seen in these 8 observations so far. Second, in
the context of a pandemic, the government may be willing to give more resources compared to a
usual time to cope with the response and there may even be cross-national collaborations to help
combat the crisis. Therefore, even though there are differences in the medical resources, this
difference is minimized by the resource flux from other regions and non-government organizations.
For example, some provinces in China have sent over doctors to provinces with more severe
conditions of COVID to help even out the differences in medical resources.
Additionally, we only use the hospital beds per capita as a very rough proxy for the
available medical resources. There may be other proxies that are more representative for the
available medical resources. A good example maybe the number of doctors in the regions and the
easiness to access the hospital settings. Especially during the special context of COVID, more
places may be used as hospital beds and other medical resources to help with the pandemics and
hence our current proxy may not be as appropriate.

5.3.3 Hypothesis 3—Overall Strength of the Economy
The overall strength of the economy is measured by the GDP per capita level. Out of all
the variables, the GDP is the most significant and most important variable in predicting the
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outcome. This means that the overall performance level of a country’s or a region’s GDP is very
correlated with how well the place can handle the hit of a pandemic from the point of view of
containing the spread of the case. Surprisingly, however, is that the coefficient for GDP per capita
is positive, meaning that the higher the GDP level, the higher the population adjusted growth rate
of cases. This is interesting because it seems to be counterintuitively of what one would expect
(i.e., it’s normally assumed that countries and regions with a higher GDP level will have a better
response because they have more resources and etc.)
The author came up with two explanations for the unexpected results for GDP per capita.
For one, the higher the GDP, the region may have more interconnectedness within the region and
with other places. Hence, there may be a consistently higher levels of travel frequency in these
regions. The higher the traveling frequencies may continue to be the trend even during pandemics
times, and hence increasing the probability of spreading the virus within the regions especially at
the beginning phase of the outbreak. Second, there may just be different reporting counting
methods for the number of cases. It may be that countries and regions with higher levels of
economy strength have a more comprehensive method in censoring the cases and deaths,
especially at the beginning of the pandemic phase. Nevertheless, regardless of the surprising
direction of the GDP per capita variable, it is the most important significant variable in the model
and can explain the most variations.

5.3.4 Hypothesis 4—Experience Dealing with Past Pandemics
Experience dealing with past pandemics is also statistically significant and very correlated
with the outcome of the COVID containment. The coefficient for the experience dealing with past
pandemics is also positive, meaning that the more experiences a region has dealing with past
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pandemics, the higher the population adjusted growth rate of cases (i.e., the worse the outcome).
This may also seem counterintuitive at the first place. However, the explanation could be provided
that the regions with more experiences may be the regions more susceptible to disease outbreaks.
Therefore, the fact that some regions have more past experience may not necessarily be a good
thing, because it indicates the susceptibility of these places to worldwide pandemics. The statistical
significance of the variable means that experience dealing with past pandemics is an important
factor influencing the difference in the effectiveness of government response policies. More
experiences lead to higher levels of growth rate, and the underlying reason may be due to the innate
differences in the susceptibility of these regions.

5.3.5—Hypothesis 5: Demographics
In the quantitative model, the author didn’t specifically model the demographics data (i.e.,
the demographics data is not taken into account in the input variables). Instead, the demographics
consideration, and specifically the population data, is incorporated in the output variable
calculation. Since we use the population adjusted growth rate as the output variable (i.e., looking
at the growth rate per 100,000 people), we have considered how the differences in population may
have biased the absolute number of cases. As we can see from the differences in the actual growth
rate vs. the population adjusted growth rate, the demographics adjusted data actually change the
scope of the output and make the models more applicable in the context of this research.
Additionally, the demographics may influence many other aspects of the model. For
example, the demographics may be related with the strength of the economy in the country and
the available medical resources. The author tries un-bias the model by using variables that take
into account this consideration. For example, the author used the medical resources per capita
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instead of total medical resources for these regions. However, there still remains the possibility
that more influences of the demographics data on other variables are not discovered or that the
demographics may be the confounding factor in some of the conclusions that we draw earlier.
Therefore, the preliminary message is that the demographics of these regions are important
to predict the outcome of pandemics control, just like the demographics data is generally important
in many infectious disease contexts. Although this research does show that the demographics, and
especially the population density, may indeed be correlated with the outcome and may contribute
to the differences in the effectiveness of government response policies, more detailed research
needs to be conducted. Specifically, future research could look at the correlations between how
exactly the demographic data influences the outcome variables.

5.4 Synthesis
To conclude, the data analysis suggests that the strength of the economy, timeliness of
response, and experiences dealing with past pandemics are the best candidates to explain the
differences in the effectiveness of government response policies. It’s an interesting result because
two of the three most important variables were initially categorized under the secondary
hypotheses and only one out of three variables was from the primary category. Out of the three
variables, the GDP per capita can explain the most variation in the outcome variable with the
highest statistical significance. The strength of the economy is expected to have a significantly
positive effect on the population adjusted growth rate. This means that the higher the GDP level,
the faster the spread of the cases within the region. The most likely explanation is the fact that
regions with higher GDP levels are more interconnected and have more traveling frequencies to
other places, hence it is more likely to have a higher rate of spread. Additionally, places with higher
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GDP levels tend to have a higher population density as we can see from the Figure 5 in the previous
section, the higher population density may lead to an unbalanced growth of cases in more densely
populated regions.
The experience dealing with past pandemics is also very statistically significant and can
explain an adequate number of variations in the effectiveness of government response policies.
Unlike what one would expect, the regions with more experiences dealing with past pandemics
actually have a worse outcome in terms of effectiveness in containing COVID. The author thinks
that it is more likely that these places are more susceptible to infectious disease outbreaks. For
example, these places could be the transportation centers or are exposed in areas where viruses can
generally live longer. Even though some government may have more experiences than others, as
indicated by Park, Choi, and Ko (2020) that South Korea was able to develop the COVID testing
kits very quickly from the ones they had for MERS, these experiences can now be easily shared
across countries and regions and hence may not be a huge advantage to the countries with more
experiences.
The timeliness of response is barely statistically significant with a relatively low R value.
Nevertheless, these three variables translated to three out of the five proposed hypotheses being
tested. It indicates that regardless of what situations the countries are in, acting earlier seems to be
better than acting later. Even though the government may change the policies later due to new
circumstances, it is essential to have some measures in place earlier than later.
The other two variables—unique number of local level policies and the available medical
resources—are not very correlated with the outcome variable. These two variables were initially
from the primary hypotheses category, but the research result doesn’t suggest that these two factors
are not related to the effectiveness of government response policies. It could be that the author
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didn’t have the best proxy for these two variables, and it could also be that the author wasn’t able
to model more details about the policies instead of just the number of policies. More research is
needed to explore whether these two variables are just not correlated with how effective the
government response policy is at all, or there are actual correlations that were not explored in this
research.
Additionally, there are two caveats to be aware of when thinking about the conclusion for
this research. One is that there are only 8 observations in total and there aren’t many variations
within the data, especially for the input variables. This makes the dataset not a perfect setup for
correlation and regression analysis, as generally more data and more variation are preferred. This
also makes Singapore an outlier from the data because the other outcome variables have much
lower numbers. The second caveat is that these regions of studies all have relatively good
containment of COVID when compared to the word averages, so the results may be biased because
we are looking at one end of the story. It may be worthwhile to include countries that have
relatively different levels of COVID controls to see whether the same conclusions can be draw.
Therefore, due to these caveats, it’s important to note that the conclusions drawn below should
only be interpreted in the context of these regions.

6. Limitations
Given the nature and data collection of this research, there are three main limitations of the
research. First, as discussed in the Data and Methods section above, we only have a total of 8
observations. This is an extremely small number to build a good correlation or regression model
as the correlations in a small number of datasets are more likely to be due to random chances. The
two most significant effects of only have 8 observations are: 1) lack of variations in the input data;
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2) it makes Singapore an extreme outlier in the output metrics. Additionally, all these regions have
a relatively effective policy response judging from the overall sentiments coming from the world,
so this research may only be capturing part of the story for the effectiveness. The author justifies
the choice of these countries and regions as explained in the Introduction section before because
these regions experienced COVID more as a shock and have data more readily available in the
earlier months. However, the author does recognize the unpreventable bias introduced by only
focusing on these regions and argue that the results of this research should not be interpreted
outside of the context provided.
Second, the variables used in this research may not be the best and only ones important in
the context of a policy response study. There may be a two-fold problem with the variables of
choice in this research. First, some of the variables chosen for the quantitative analysis may not be
the best proxies for the questions of interest. There may be other more appropriate variables in the
context as explained in the Evidence and Discussion section above. The author chose the variables
deliberately due to the ability to collect those real-time data remotely and accurately. Second, there
may be other confounding factors that are either not fully explored or not considered at all in this
research but could be correlated with the disparities in the effectiveness of government policy
responses. Such an example could be the political structure of a country or a region, as the
policymakers are often bounded by the political structures to react to crisis in certain ways. Another
instance is the demographics data. More research is needed in order to fully understand the direct
relationships between some of the demographic metrics to the outcome variable. Therefore, the
author recognizes the limitations in the variables that are considered and analyzed in this research.
Third, common to all kinds of policy research, the lack of counterfactual makes it
impossible to draw causal relationships and may have bias the study of how strong the correlation
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is. Even though we are using the regions as a comparison for each other, we cannot entail the
specific effects of a variable on the outcome. For example, we cannot predict whether
country/region X will have a more effective policy response results if country/region X have had
more experiences dealing with past pandemics due to the lack of counterfactuals. The author tries
to minimize the impact of this limitation by focusing on the regions that identified the first COVID
cases at around relatively the same time and have experienced COVID more as a shock to their
society (i.e., These regions are relatively close to the hotspots and didn’t have much time to prepare
for it compared to many other countries and regions in the world.) These two factors ensure that
these 8 regions are more comparable and hence minimizing the impact of heterogeneity. However,
the author still recognizes the lack of counterfactual being an important factor for the lack of a
stronger relationship to be identified between the effectiveness of policy responses and the
hypotheses.

7. Conclusions and Future Research Directions
To understand what influences the outcome disparities in COVID-19 response policies, the
author explored both the current literatures and establish primary models for analysis. First the
study focuses on the current sentiments from literatures and reports, then it shows the collection
of primary and secondary data to establish the model, and finally quantitative and qualitative data
analysis are provided to explain the most important variables affecting the differences in outcomes.
In this section, the author summarizes the most important insights gained from this thesis research,
provides actionable recommendations to policymakers, and sheds light on future research
considerations.
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7.1 Insights and Takeaways
Out of the five proposed hypotheses, three of them are shown to be correlated with the
effectiveness of COVID policy responses and they provide actionable insights. First, the strength
of the economy shows that higher the GDP per capita level, the lower the effectiveness. Countries
with higher levels of GDPs may tend to think that they have more medical resources to be deployed
when dealing with health care emergencies and hence should be less concerned about the crisis.
However, this research suggests the opposite. It may be because countries with higher GDP level
have a much higher level of population density and more frequent travels between other places.
Hence, these countries should actually be more careful under the context of infectious disease
outbreaks. A good strategy will be early implementation of travel restrictions and close monitoring
of travelers to minimize the number of imported cases (Lam et al, 2020). Additionally, people
living in these high-income and densely populated areas should be more alerted and willingly
avoid going to crowded places as early as possible. The travel restrictions and voluntary social
distancing may have a significant impact on slowing down the growth rate of infectious diseases
transmission (Lam et al, 2020). In order to achieve these goals, the government needs to be
prepared early on and provide adequate public education to its residents.
Second, the timeliness of response in any pandemic is crucial. Note that in the models
discussed above, the author didn’t specify the details of which policies were implemented. The
models simply take into account the number of unique local level policies and evaluates the
timeliness of response by looking at the average implementation dates of these policies. The
significant correlations indicate that regardless of what kinds of policies will be in place in the
context of infectious disease outbreaks, it is important that these policies will be published and
implemented as early as possible. It is understandable that some governments may choose a more
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cautious attitude when it comes to disease outbreaks (i.e., not announcing any policies until more
information is gathered and known). However, from the results of this research, it is better to act
earlier even though it’s not the best policy, but it may be the most optimal policy at the time given
the limited knowledge. Acting early can be beneficial to the local citizens and even citizens
residing in other regions. Additionally, since the policies often change with the progress of the
disease transmission, the tolerability of not-so-accurate policies at the beginning of the outbreak is
generally higher. For countries and regions that chose to be more conservative in responding to
COVID, they should be more alerted and willing to announce their policies earlier even when there
are still many unknown factors around the crisis.
Lastly, past experienced dealing with the pandemics indicates that regions with more
experiences actually have a lower effectiveness. This doesn’t mean that having experiences doesn’t
help at all with future pandemics. What this may really suggest is that some regions may be more
susceptible to infectious disease outbreaks than others and these regions should be especially
alerted. Potential reasons behind the high susceptibility could be that these regions are
transportation hubs (i.e., frequent travels from and to other places) or the climate and weather in
these places facilitate the disease transmission more easily. Regardless of the reasons, these regions
should reflect on their past experiences and be even more careful whenever the next disease
outbreak may be threatening. Some qualitative evidence does suggest that regions with more
experiences can come up with a plan more quickly or design and manufacture the testing kits more
easily (Park and Chung, 2021). However, this advantage may be offset by the fact that these
regions are more susceptible, and the viruses usually hit the areas faster.
It’s actually interesting to observe what variables influence the outcomes of COVID policy
responses. Overall, the message is clear—the outcome of COVID control could be affected by
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multiple variables in different ways. Given that infectious disease outbreak is unpredictable and
unstable, countries and regions should all be prepared for the worst-case scenarios. All three
hypotheses above together re-emphasized the importance of institutional learnings. Especially
worth noting is the unexpected results from the relationships with GDP and experiences dealing
with past pandemics. Countries and regions with more advanced economic development and more
experiences with past pandemics should actually be more alerted in case of health care crisis. If
the government can learn from the experiences of COVID and reflect on what factors influenced
the outcomes, they should be able to come up with emergency plans based on their local situations.
The more prepared the government, the better the chance to contain the spread of infectious disease
at an earlier stage.

7.2 Future Considerations
Even though it is crucial to provide prompt analysis of the COVID response policies in
order to provide real-time feedback and actionable plans, there remain some unsolved questions.
The author believes that the research fields still require the following three aspects of additional
studies in order to advance the field of COVID-19 policy analysis further.
First, more research is needed in providing lateral comparisons on more regions. As
mentioned in the previous sections, only 8 observations in the quantitative data model have
weakened the explanatory power of our models. It’s important to include more countries or regions
for comparison and to establish a stronger relationship. Even though the methods of this research
are replicable to many other regions, it is suggested that future studies should focus on more
regions for comparison in general. Additionally, because these 8 regions are on the spectrum of
relative effective outcomes compared to the world, it’s important to also include more variations
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in the model in the future. By introducing regions with even more disparate outcomes, the research
may identify different factors contributing to the large disparities observed.
Second, future research should explore different variables than the ones included in this
study. Due to the availability of many data at early stages of COVID outbreak and the author’s
constraint to collect abundant data, some of the variables do not incorporate all the levels of details
that the author expected. For example, a more detailed explorations into different kinds of local
level policies and whether a particular policy has an impact on the overall effectiveness of response
can be worth exploring. Additionally, many variables that are not mentioned in this study can be
valuable to study as well. The author encourages the field to explore more broadly and test out
different hypotheses. In the end, a research effort to compare and contrast the important
contributing factors is required to have a significant impact in the field of COVID policy responses.
Third, there is a need for the long-term monitoring of the effectiveness of COVID response
policies. As COVID continues to threat the health of the world, there seems to be different impacts
at different stages of the disease outbreak. This research focuses solely on the beginning period of
the outbreak and in regions that are affected relatively early on and experienced COVID as an
exogenous shock. More studies on different countries which encounter COVID at relatively
different time frames can provide insights into whether the influencing factors change over time.
Additionally, a long-term follow-up on the regions of studies is important as authors can compare
and contrast across the academic field whether the same regions experience different outcomes
over a longer period of time.
It takes a great amount of collective efforts to understand the variations in COVID-19
containment outcomes. It is even more difficult to dissect what are the most important contributing
factors to such disparities. An interpretation into this field can have significant impact on how the
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governments can best prepare for future health care crisis. It is the author’s hope that this thesis
research contributes to the scholarly field by summarizing the status quo and provides a detailed
comparison of the regions of interest.

Last but not the least, a special thanks to Professor Mark V. Pauly on his suggestions and
mentoring throughout this thesis research, without whom I would definitely not be able to complete
such a project. Another special thanks to Dr. Utsav Schurmans for providing and organizing the
Wharton Research Scholars opportunity for me to start thinking about a research topic of great
importance to me.

93

WORKS CITED
Ahmad, A., Krumkamp, R., & Reintjes, R. (2009). Controlling SARS: a review on China’s
response compared with other SARS-affected countries. Tropical Medicine & International
Health, 14: 36-45. doi:10.1111/j.1365-3156.2008.02146.x
Baharudin, H., and Wong, L. (2020). Coronavirus: Singapore Develops Smartphone App for
Efficient Contact Tracing. The Straits Times. Accessed: December 14th, 2020.
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/coronavirus-singapore-develops-smartphone-appfor-efficient-contact-tracing.
Brudon, P., and Cheng, M. (2006). Vietnam: tough decisions pay off in: SARS: How a Global
Epidemic Was Stopped. WHO, Geneva, pp. 94–100.
Chan, L., Chen, L. & Xu, J. (2010). China’s Engagement with Global Health Diplomacy: Was
SARS a Watershed? The PLos Medicine, 4 (7). doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.1000266
Cheng, H.-Y., Jian, S.-W., Liu, D.-P., Ng, T.-C., Huang, W.-T., & Lin, H.-H. (2020). Contact
Tracing Assessment of COVID-19 Transmission Dynamics in Taiwan and Risk at Different
Exposure Periods Before and After Symptom Onset. JAMA Internal Medicine. doi:
10.1001/jamainternmed.2020.2020
Chen, S., Zhang, Z., Yang, J., Wang, J., Zhai, X., Bärnighausen, T. & Wang, C. (2020).
Fangcang Shelter Hospitals: a Novel Concept for Responding to Public Health Emergencies.
The Lancet 395, no. 10232: 1305–14. doi: 10.1016/s0140-6736(20)30744-3.

94

Cheng, Y., Yu, J., Shen, Y., & Huang, B. (2020). “Coproducing Responses to COVID ‐19 with
Community‐Based Organizations: Lessons from Zhejiang Province, China.” Public
Administration Review 80, no. 5: 866–73. doi:10.1111/puar.13244.
Cohen, J., and Kupferschmidt, K. (2020). Countries Test Tactics in ‘War’ against COVID-19.
Science 367, no. 6484: 1287–88. doi:10.1126/science.367.6484.1287
COVID-19 Map. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
COVID-19 situation reports. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-reports/
Cowling, B. J., Ali, S. T., Ng, T. W. Y et al. (2020). Impact Assessment of Non-Pharmaceutical
Interventions against Coronavirus Disease 2019 and Influenza in Hong Kong: an
Observational Study. The Lancet Public Health 5, no. 5. doi: 10.1016/s24682667(20)30090-6.
Dan, F., Vlas, D., Sake, J. et al. (2009) The SARS epidemic in mainland China: bringing
together all epidemiological data. Tropical Medicine and International Health 14 (s1): 4–
13. doi:10.1111/j.1365-3156.2008.02145.x
Fighting the Coronavirus Pandemic, East Asian Responses - Republic of Korea: Mass-testing,
targeted investigations and the transparency issue. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/fighting-coronavirus-pandemic-east-asianresponses-republic-korea-mass-testing-targeted

95

Gan, N., & Culver, D. (2020, April 16). China is fighting the coronavirus with a digital QR code.
Here's how it works. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/15/asia/chinacoronavirus-qr-code-intl-hnk/index.html
Goggin G. (2020). COVID-19 apps in Singapore and Australia: reimagining healthy nations with
digital tehnology. Media International Australia;1329878X20949770.
doi:10.1177/1329878X20949770
Gralinski, L. E., & Menachery, V. D. (2020). Return of the Coronavirus: 2019nCoV. Viruses, 12 (2): 135. doi:10.3390/v12020135
Hartley, K. and Jarvis, D. S. L. (2020). Policymaking in the low-trust state: legitimacy, state
capacity, and responses to COVID-19 in Hong Kong. Society, 39 (3): 403-423. doi:
10.1080/14494035.2020.1783791
Help speed up contact tracing with TraceTogether. (n.d.). Retrieved from
https://www.gov.sg/article/help-speed-up-contact-tracing-with-tracetogether
Hsueh, H.-P., Wang, C.-M., Wu, C.-F., & Li, F. (2019). Investigation of the Co-Movement
Relationship between Medical Expenditure and GDP in Taiwan-Based on Wavelet
Analysis. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 16 (24):
5095. doi: 10.3390/ijerph16245095
Huang, Y., Sun, M., & Sui, Y. (2020, April 15). How Digital Contact Tracing Slowed Covid-19
in East Asia. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-digital-contact-tracing-slowedcovid-19-in-east-asia

96

Imai, N., Dorigatti, I., Cori, A., Riley, S. & Ferguson, N.M. (2020). Estimating the Potential
Total Number of Novel Coronavirus Cases in Wuhan City, China. Imperial College London.
Kuguyo, O., Andre, P. K., & Collet D. (2020). “Singapore COVID-19 Pandemic Response as a
Successful Model Framework for Low-Resource Health Care Settings in Africa?” OMICS:
A Journal of Integrative Biology 24, no. 8: 470–78. doi: 10.1089/omi.2020.0077.
Lam, H. Y., Lam, T. S., Wong, C. H. et al. (2020). The Epidemiology of COVID-19 Cases and
the Successful Containment Strategy in Hong Kong–January to May 2020. International
Journal of Infectious Diseases 98: 51–58. doi:10.1016/j.ijid.2020.06.057.
Lee, M., and You, M. (2020). Psychological and Behavioral Responses in South Korea During
the Early Stages of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). International Journal of
Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 9: 2977. doi:10.3390/ijerph17092977
Leung, K., Wu, J. T., Liu, D., & Leung, G. M. (2020). First-wave COVID-19 transmissibility
and severity in China outside Hubei after control measures, and second-wave scenario
planning: a modelling impact assessment. The Lancet, 395(10233), 1382–1393. doi:
10.1016/s0140-6736(20)30746-7
Liang, F. (2020). COVID-19 and Health Code: How Digital Platforms Tackle the Pandemic in
China. Social Media and Society. doi:10.1177/2056305120947657
Lin, C., Braund,W. E,, & Auerbach J, et al. (2020). Policy Decisions and Use of Information
Technology to Fight COVID-19, Taiwan. Emerg Infect Dis. 2020; 26 (7):1506-1512.
doi:10.3201/eid2607.200574

97

Ng, Y., Li, Z., Chua, Y. X., Chaw, W. L., Zhao, Z., Er, B., & Lee, V. J. (2020). Evaluation of the
Effectiveness of Surveillance and Containment Measures for the First 100 Patients with
COVID-19 in Singapore — January 2–February 29, 2020. MMWR. Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report, 69 (11): 307–311. doi: 10.15585/mmwr.mm6911e1
Pang X, Zhu Z, Xu F et al. (2003) Evaluation of control measures implemented in the severe
acute respiratory syndrome outbreak in Beijing 2003. JAMA 290: 3215–3221.
Park, J., and Chung, E. (2021). “Learning from Past Pandemic Governance: Early Response and
Public-Private Partnerships in Testing of COVID-19 in South Korea.” World Development
137105198. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105198.
Park, S., Choi, G. J., & Ko, H. (2020). Information Technology–Based Tracing Strategy in
Response to COVID-19 in South Korea—Privacy Controversies. Jama. doi:
10.1001/jama.2020.6602
Pope, C., Ziebland, S., & Mays, N. (2000). Qualitative research in health care. Analysing
qualitative data. BMJ (Clinical research ed.), 320 (7227): 114–116. doi:
org/10.1136/bmj.320.7227.114
Schwartz, J., amd Evans, R. G. (2007). Causes of Effective Policy Implementation: China's
public health response to SARS. Journal of Contemporary China, 16 (51): 195-213.
doi:10.1080/10670560701194426
Siedner, M.J., Gostine, L.O., Carnmer H.H., & Kraemer, J.D. (2015). Strengthening the
Detection of and Early Response to Public Health Emergencies: lessons from the west
African Ebola epidemic. The PLos Medicine. Public Library of Science, doi:
10.1371/journal.pmed.1001804
98

"Singapore's COVID-19 Contact Tracing App Now Freely Available To Developers."
International Business Times [U.S. ed.], 27 Mar. 2020. Gale General OneFile, https://linkgalecom.proxy.library.upenn.edu/apps/doc/A618639200/ITOF?u=upenn_main&sid=ITOF&
xid=01a43142. Accessed 11 May 2020.
Shevchenko, A. (2020, February 18). China Tracks Victims of Coronavirus with WeChat and
Alipay. Retrieved from https://cointelegraph.com/news/china-tracks-victims-of-coronaviruswith-wechat-and-alipay
Smith, R. D. (2006). Responding to global infectious disease outbreaks: Lessons from SARS on
the role of risk perception, communication and management. Social Science & Medicine, 63
(12): 3113-3123. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2006.08.004
Smith, M. (2020, Apr 27). China's health code app fighting infection. The Australian Financial
Review. Retrieved from https://proxy.library.upenn.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.proxy.library.upenn.edu/docview/2394677403?accountid=14707
Song, H., Li, F., Jia, Z. et al. (2020). Using traveller-derived cases in Henan Province to quantify
the spread of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China. Nonlinear Dyn 101, 1821–183. doi:
10.1007/s11071-020-05859-1
Tan C-C (2006) SARS in Singapore – key lessons from an epidemic. Annals of the Academy of
Medicine, Singapore 35, 345–349.
Wang, C. J., Ng C. Y., & Brook R.H. (2020). Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: Big Data
Analytics, New Technology, and Proactive Testing. JAMA. 2020; 323(14):1341–1342.
doi:10.1001/jama.2020.3151

99

Wang, Y., and Tenuis, P. (2020). Strongly heterogeneous transmission of COVID–19 in
mainland China: local and regional variation. Accessed: December 14th, 2020.
https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.10.20033852v1.full.pdf
Wei, X., Li, H., Yang, N., Wong, S. Y. S., Owolabi, O., Xu, J., & Griffiths, S. M. (2015).
Comparing Quality of Public Primary Care between Hong Kong and Shanghai Using
Validated Patient Assessment Tools. Plos One, 10 (3). doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0121269
Wong, J., Goh, Q.Y., Tan, Z. et al. (2020). Preparing for a COVID-19 pandemic: a review of
operating room outbreak response measures in a large tertiary hospital in Singapore. Can J
Anesth/J Can Anesth 67, 732–745. doi: 10.1007/s12630-020-01620-9
Yang, X., Chen, X., Ding, C., Bai, Z., Zhu, J., Sun, G., & Yu, G. (2020). Epidemiological
Investigation and Prevention Control Analysis of Longitudinal Distribution of COVID-19 in
Henan Province, China. mSphere 5 (5):e00867-20. doi: 10.1128/mSphere.00867-20
Zhang, J., Lin, G., Zeng, G., Lin, J., Tian, J. & Li, G. (2020). Challenges of SARS-CoV-2 and
Lessons Learnt from SARS in Guangdong Province, China. Journal of Clinical Virology
126: 104341. doi:10.1016/j.jcv.2020.104341.
Zhang, J., Zhou, L., Yang, Y., Peng, W., Wang, W., & Chen, X. (2020). Therapeutic and triage
strategies for 2019 novel coronavirus disease in fever clinics. The Lancet. Respiratory
Medicine, doi:10.1016/S2213-2600(20)30071-0
Zhang, K., Chung, K., & Wong, N. (2020, March 27). Home-quarantine measures defended as
experts warn more must be done. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/health-environment/article/3077173/coronavirus-officials-defend-hong-kongs-home

100

APPENDIX A
Data sources for the preliminary policy results attached above:
1. JHU COVID-19 tracker:
https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423
467b48e9ecf6
2. 1 Point 3 Acres: https://coronavirus.1point3acres.com/zh/world
3. WHO April 20th COVID-19 report: https://www.who.int/docs/defaultsource/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200420-sitrep-91-covid-19.pdf?sfvrsn=fcf0670b_4
4. GDP per capita for provinces in China (2019): https://www.ceicdata.com/en/china/grossdomestic-product-per-capita
5. World GDP per capita data (2019):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)_per_capita
6. Contact tracing for South Korea: Park, Choi, and Ko (2020).
7. Contact tracing for Singapore: https://www.gov.sg/article/help-speed-up-contact-tracingwith-tracetogether
8. Contact tracing for Hong Kong: Huang, Sun, and Sui (2020, April 15).
9. Contact tracing for Taiwan: Cheng, Jian, Liu, Ng, Huang, and Lin (2020).
10. Contact tracing for China: Gan, and Culver (2020, April 16).
11. HK quarantine measures: Zhang, Chung, and Wong (2020, March 27).
12. Singapore quarantine measures: Ng et al (2020)
13. South Korea quarantine measures: https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/fightingcoronavirus-pandemic-east-asian-responses-republic-korea-mass-testing-targeted
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APPENDIX B
Data sources for the calculations of dependent and independent variables:
1. Number of COVID cases in China (Live updates): http://2019ncov.chinacdc.cn/2019-nCoV/
2. Number of hospital beds per capita for different provinces in mainland China:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/279374/number-of-beds-in-chinese-hospitals-and-healthcenters-byregion/#:~:text=This%20statistic%20shows%20the%20number,for%201%2C000%20inhabit
ants%20in%20Beijing.
3. Number of hospital beds per capita for HK: https://www.statista.com/statistics/318871/hongkong-hospital-beddensity/#:~:text=In%202018%2C%20Hong%20Kong's%20hospital,5.4%20beds%20per%20
thousand%20inhabitants
4. Number of hospital beds per capita for TW:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/324721/taiwan-hospital-beddensity/#:~:text=Hospital%20bed%20density%20in%20Taiwan%202007%2D2017&text=In
%202017%2C%20Taiwan's%20hospital%20bed,beds%20per%20ten%20thousand%20inhab
itants
5. Number of hospital beds per capita for South Korea:
https://www.statista.com/statistics/647213/hospital-bed-density-south-korea/
6. Number of hospital beds per capita for Singapore:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.BEDS.ZS
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APPENDIX C
Explanation for the cutoff points for the quantitative models:
1. Cutoff points for dependent variables:

(Figure 31. Dependent Variables explanations)
a. Growth Rate: cut-off points for “Low” is anything below 5; cut-off points for “Medium”
is anything in between 5 and 20; cut-off points for “High” is anything higher than 20.
b. Population Adjusted Growth Rate: cut-off points for “Low” is anything below 0.1; cut-off
points for “Medium” is anything in between 0.1 and 0.5; cut-off points for “High” is
anything higher than 0.5.
c. Death Rate by Number of Cases: cut-off points for “Very low” is anything below 1%;
cut-off points for “Low” is anything in between 1% and 5%, no higher ranges were
observed.
2. Cutoff points for independent variables:
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(Figure 32. Independent Variables explanations)
a. GDP per capita: cut-off points for “Low” is anything below 15000; cut-off points for
“Medium” is anything in between 15000 and 40000; cut-off points for “High” is anything
higher than 40000.
b. Medical Resources: cut-off points for “Low” is anything below 4; cut-off points for
“Medium” is anything in between 4 and 8; cut-off points for “High” is anything higher
than 8.
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APPENDIX D
Additional quantitative models are provided below:
1. The best model for continuous outcome and input variables:

(Figure 33. Continuous outcome variables and continuous input variables)
2. The best model for continuous outcome variables and categorical input variables:
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(Figure 34. Continuous outcome variables and categorical input variables)
3. The best model for categorical outcome and input variables:

(Figure 35. Categorical outcome variables and categorical input variables)
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